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Sentencing law fails to provide judges with the tools necessary to prevent 
anticipated and unjustified harm to prisoners.  Judges can foresee that certain 
individuals—often because of their mental or physical disabilities, sexual 
orientation, or diminutive size1—will experience serious physical abuse or 
mental injury while imprisoned.2  Currently, concerned judges may call these 
offenders’ susceptibilities to harm or anticipated special needs to the attention 
of correctional officials or suggest certain housing or treatment in prison through 
their sentencing orders.3  However, these findings and recommendations are 
non-binding, and officials may not even notify judges when they choose to 
disregard such requests.4  Judges presently lack the authority to order any 
condition of confinement, or to prevent the imposition of a particular condition, 
even if they believe a condition is critical to the humaneness of an offender’s 
carceral sentence or to the effectuation of its objectives.  This Article builds the 
case for granting judges that authority within the context of one vulnerable 
population of prisoners: those with major mental disorders.5 
Prisons are overwhelmed with inmates with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, 
and other serious mental illnesses, conditions that leave inmates poorly equipped 
to navigate these dangerous environments.6  The hazards that seriously 
                                                 
 1. See 28 C.F.R. § 115.41 (2013) (identifying risk factors for sexual assault in prison, which 
include mental illness; physical or developmental disability; youth; diminutive size; a history of 
victimization; first, nonviolent, or sexual offender status; and perception as gay, bisexual, 
transgender, or gender-nonconforming); see also NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, 
NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMMISSION REPORT 7–8, 69–74 (2009), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/226680.pdf (discussing risk factors). 
 2. See E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: A Theory of Sentencing and Mental 
Illness, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 181–82 & nn.172–75 (2013); Adam J. Kolber, The 
Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 188–89 & n.11 (2009). 
 3. See infra notes 181, 302–06 and accompanying text (discussing the types of 
recommendations judges may make for vulnerable defendants). 
 4. See ALLAN ELLIS ET AL., FEDERAL PRISON GUIDEBOOK 27 (2012); see also infra note 
305 and accompanying text (discussing the frequency with which Federal Bureau of Prisons 
officials adopt judicial recommendations). 
 5. See infra note 19 and accompanying text (defining the population at issue). 
 6. See HOLLY HILLS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EFFECTIVE PRISON MENTAL HEALTH 
SERVICES 2–3 (2004), available at http://static.nicic.gov/Library/018604.pdf.  Experts estimate 
that around sixteen percent of prisoners have a mental disorder.  Id. at 3; Kenneth Adams & Joseph 
Ferrandino, Managing Mentally Ill Inmates in Prisons, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 913, 913 (2008).  
This rate exceeds the incidence of mental disorder within the non-incarcerated community.  DORIS 
J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON 
AND JAIL INMATES 3 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf 
(reporting that around eleven percent of individuals age eighteen or older in the general population 
of the United States satisfies DSM-IV criteria for symptoms of a mental health disorder).  Because 
male prisoners constitute ninety-three percent of the prisoner population in the United States, this 
Article will focus on male prisoners.  See HEATHER C. WEST ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
PRISONERS IN 2009, at 2 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf. 
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disordered inmates face are numerous and substantial.7  For instance, 
correctional officials may fail to detect an inmate’s disorder8 or treat it 
effectively.9  Prisons typically house mentally ill offenders within the general 
prison population, where they are especially likely to suffer physical and sexual 
victimization.10  For disciplinary or protective reasons, correctional officials are 
disproportionately likely to transfer disordered inmates to solitary confinement, 
where they often experience serious psychological deterioration and acute 
distress.11  These foreseeable harms may undermine the purposes of an 
offender’s punishment and render his sentence disproportionate or even 
inhumane. 
Cognizant of this reality, a number of jurisdictions factor offender 
vulnerability—a term used by this Article to include both substantial risks of 
serious harm and a need for treatment or protection—into sentencing to a limited 
extent.  A handful of jurisdictions permit judges to commit certain individuals 
for mental health treatment in lieu of imprisonment.12  A larger number of states 
allow trial courts to depart from presumptive sentences when offenders require 
specialized treatment or would face excessive hardship in prison.13  Many of 
these jurisdictions permit a finding of vulnerability to support a stayed sentence 
of incarceration with probation,14 while others authorize a reduction in the 
duration of an offender’s carceral term upon a vulnerability determination.15  
These efforts are laudable.  However, they do not provide adequate relief for 
vulnerable offenders sentenced to imprisonment because they fail to authorize 
judges to alter an inmate’s likely conditions of confinement. 
                                                 
 7. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 181–82 & nn.172–75.  This Article focuses on individuals 
with serious mental illnesses who are sentenced to prison.  However, a defendant’s mental disorder 
may not be his only source of vulnerability to serious harm in prison.  See supra note 1 (identifying 
other sources of vulnerability).  Any additional risk factors should also factor into a sentencing 
calculus to ensure that sentences are humane, proportionate, and serve the intended aims of 
punishment. 
 8. See infra Part I.B. (discussing the shortcomings of mental health evaluation procedures in 
prisons). 
 9. See infra Part I.C. (surveying and evaluating mental health treatment procedures in 
prisons). 
 10. See infra notes 88, 95 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra Part III.A. (analyzing these jurisdictions). 
 13. See infra Part III.B.  Specific authorization to factor vulnerability into sentencing is most 
critical in jurisdictions that limit sentencing judges’ discretion.  About half of all states employ 
indeterminate sentencing schemes that allow for wide judicial discretion, while the remaining 
jurisdictions limit judges’ abilities to vary sentences according to offender characteristics through 
sentencing guidelines or a statutory determinate sentencing regime.  See Kevin Reitz, The 
“Traditional” Indeterminate Sentencing Model, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND 
CORRECTIONS 270, 270–71 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012). 
 14. See infra notes 195–97 and accompanying text (discussing these jurisdictions). 
 15. See infra notes 199–202 and accompanying text (discussing these jurisdictions). 
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To address that concern, this Article extends these statutory frameworks to the 
carceral context.  In particular, it advocates for authorizing judges to tailor the 
conditions of confinement for seriously disordered, vulnerable offenders.  With 
that authority, judges could design sentences to meet the needs of mentally ill 
prisoners, obviate unjustifiable hardships, and, hopefully, reduce the extent to 
which their disorders exacerbate the severity of their prison experiences.  The 
Article considers a number of tailoring options that each affect correctional 
affairs to a different degree and offer unique efficiency benefits. 
In arguing for an expansion of sentencing authority over conditions of 
confinement, this Article contributes to the ongoing conversation in the 
scholarly literature concerning whether and how sentencing should respond to 
foreseeable but unintended harm.  The author’s previous work has supported the 
efforts of Professor Adam Kolber and others, who have theorized that just 
punishment must consider foreseeable harm to offenders.16  One effective 
critique of those efforts has been the practical observation that recognizing 
susceptibility to harm in sentencing would entail giving lesser punishments (i.e., 
shorter carceral sentences) to sensitive, but equally culpable, offenders, which 
would undermine the value of parity in punishment and the predictability of the 
sentencing process.17  This Article suggests an alternative means of accounting 
for vulnerability that would avoid that pitfall: give equally culpable offenders 
the same basic punishment (i.e., terms of incarceration of the same duration), 
but tailor the sentences of vulnerable prisoners to remove the unacceptable 
hardships that flow from each individual’s disability.18 
                                                 
 16. See Adam J. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, 18 LEGAL THEORY 1, 3–4 (2012) 
(arguing for a “justification-symmetry principle,” whereby state actors must justify harm purposely, 
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently caused in the name of just punishment); see also Johnston, 
supra note 2, at 190–91 (commending this theory). 
 17. See Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity 
to Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907, 978–82 (2010). 
 18. Other scholars have also advocated for the consideration of correctional conditions in 
sentencing.  See Myrna S. Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in a Post-Booker Federal Guidelines 
World, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 691, 741–42 (2006) (suggesting that courts consider women’s heath 
issues in sentencing); Ken Strutin, The Realignment of Incarcerative Punishment: Sentencing 
Reform and the Conditions of Confinement, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1313, 1357–71 (2012) 
(suggesting that sentencing courts be permitted to consider the humaneness of treatment in prison 
under an Eighth Amendment analysis); cf. Adam J. Kolber, Against Proportional Punishment, 66 
VAND. L. REV. 1141, 1143 (2013) (arguing that, “once we understand punishment severity in terms 
of harsh treatment rather than a more neatly bordered but inaccurate construct like days in prison, 
we must consider the actual amount of harsh treatment we inflict,” which will vary by an inmate’s 
facility and how he experiences that facility, among other factors); Alexander A. Reinert, Eighth 
Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of Confinement Litigation Benefit from Proportionality 
Theory?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53, 85–86 (2009) (suggesting that the partial unification of the 
proportionality and conditions of confinement analyses under the Eighth Amendment could result 
in constitutional conditions of confinement that vary by offenders’ crimes and characteristics). 
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For clarity of analysis, this Article limits its attention to defendants with 
clinical syndromes, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major 
depression, which cause extreme distress and interfere with social and emotional 
adjustment.19  Although other risk factors exist and merit recognition,20 major 
mental disorders pose unique difficulties within a prison environment.  First, 
individuals with serious mental illnesses face the threat of declining cognitive 
function, which—because it implicates a person’s hold on reality, personality, 
and autonomy—constitutes a particularly grave danger.  Second, mental 
disorder is often difficult to diagnose, and the screening systems that prison 
intake centers use overlook some disorders, which leads to a delay in treatment 
and possible placement in an unsuitable environment.21  Other vulnerabilities, 
such as physical disability, diminutive stature, and first-offender status, may be 
easier to identify (and harder to feign).22  Third, prisons commonly protect 
offenders susceptible to abuse by placing them in protective custody or solitary 
confinement, but the prolonged confinement of a mentally disordered offender 
in isolated and extremely restrictive conditions may result in severe 
psychological damage.23  Thus, to the extent that isolation constitutes a prison’s 
primary protective mechanism, prisons may lack a means of protecting 
vulnerable, disordered offenders without further endangering their health.  
Judges may be able to compensate partially for these deficiencies through 
sentencing. 
To be clear, this Article does not advocate for the full judicial assumption of 
responsibility for evaluating and placing mentally ill inmates in appropriate 
facilities, or for a diminution of correctional responsibility in these areas.  
Indeed, prisons are well positioned for, and should accelerate their progress in, 
developing and implementing objective, verified, reliable classification 
procedures and humane housing and treatment options for mentally ill 
offenders.24  Rather, the Article merely examines whether a judge should be 
                                                 
 19. The fourth edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s  Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders characterizes these disorders as Axis I disorders.  See AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 13–24, 28 
(4th ed. rev. 2000).  The fifth, current edition of the DSM eliminates the Axis system.  See AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 16–17 
(5th ed. 2013) [herinafter DSM-5].  This Article uses serious mental illness, major mental illness, 
and major mental disorder interchangeably and mental illness and mental disorder as shorthand for 
these serious conditions.  A disordered individual is assumed to have one of these conditions. 
 20. See supra note 1 (detailing risk factors). 
 21. See infra Part I.B. (discussing the shortcomings of prison mental illness evaluations). 
 22. This observation does not apply to all vulnerabilities, such as gay or bisexual orientation.  
See supra note 1 (listing characteristics that contribute to vulnerability in prison). 
 23. See infra notes 95–97, 103–04 and accompanying text (explaining why disordered 
inmates are placed in segregated housing and discussing the effects of isolation). 
 24. See JAMES AUSTIN & KENNETH MCGINNIS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CLASSIFICATION OF 
HIGH-RISK AND SPECIAL MANAGEMENT PRISONERS 1 (2004), available at 
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authorized to shape the terms of a mentally ill offender’s carceral sentence to 
minimize its potential for serious harm. 
The adoption of this Article’s proposal would carry three practical effects.  
First, it should ameliorate the harsh conditions experienced by a subset of 
offenders.  Second, it would draw attention to the plight of mentally disordered 
prisoners and the insufficient provision of mental health care in prisons and 
perhaps spur legislative funding.  Third, addressing vulnerability in sentencing 
could strengthen inmates’ future Eighth Amendment claims.  A judicial 
pronouncement that an inmate has a serious mental disorder and requires 
treatment or protective resources should help that inmate later establish that 
relevant prison officials were aware that certain conditions could pose a 
substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate, thus satisfying part of the 
“deliberate indifference” standard necessary to prove an Eighth Amendment 
violation.25 
This Article is organized in four parts.  Part I identifies the potential perils that 
await offenders with serious mental illnesses in prison, including the 
shortcomings in the processes designed to detect offenders’ mental disorders and 
to provide them with protective and therapeutic housing.  Part II defends the 
premise that vulnerability is a legitimate concern for sentencing judges as they 
attempt to advance the various goals of punishment.  Part III details the current 
approaches employed in some jurisdictions to recognize vulnerability in 
sentencing and explains why these measures are inadequate.  Finally, Part IV 
extends these statutory frameworks to the carceral context and argues that judges 
should possess the authority to tailor the confinement conditions for vulnerable, 
seriously disordered offenders when they believe that a condition is critical to 
the humaneness or objectives of an offender’s sentence.  Part IV considers steps 
judges could take to accommodate this subset of offenders, including mandating 
comprehensive mental health examinations, disqualifying facilities particularly 
likely to exacerbate an individual’s disorder, designating facilities with certain 
treatment or protective options, and directing that offenders receive—or not 
receive—certain treatment in prison. 
I.  IDENTIFICATION AND TREATMENT OF SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESSES IN 
PRISON 
Prison is physically and psychologically hazardous for inmates with major 
mental disorders.  Recognizing the constitutional imperative to identify and treat 
                                                 
http://static.nicic.gov/Library/019468.pdf (noting that most prisons have implemented successful 
objective classification systems to assign custody levels to inmates). 
 25. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842–43 (1994) (“Whether a prison official had the 
requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual 
ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison 
official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.”); infra note 134 
(delineating standard for Eighth Amendment violation for condition of confinement). 
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these offenders,26 prisons have established procedures to detect serious mental 
health issues at intake and to factor an inmate’s mental health needs into his 
facility and housing placements.  Shortcomings exist in the current assessment 
and classification systems, however, that lead to the under-detection of mental 
disorders and unpredictable placement of mentally ill prisoners in protective 
housing.  In addition, the protective housing options afforded within many 
prisons may actually exacerbate mental disorders. 
A.  Mental Health Screening 
Prisons rely on a triage system to identify offenders with mental disorders who 
require treatment and special housing.27  The initial mental health screen—
sometimes the only assessment of an inmate’s mental health—is typically part 
of the prison intake process.28  The aims of this screen are to detect individuals 
with severe mental disorders who need immediate psychiatric attention, prevent 
suicide, continue individuals’ psychotropic medications, and identify 
individuals with non-acute mental health needs that require further assessment 
and treatment.29  In addition, the results of the mental health screen inform an 
inmate’s classification, housing, job assignment, programming, and treatment.30  
The screen typically consists of a short interview regarding an inmate’s current 
symptoms, past psychiatric history, suicide potential, social history, and level of 
education.31  The screen may also involve a review of available records and the 
administration of specialized instruments or tests.32 
                                                 
 26. See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
 27. See ALLEN J. BECK & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL 
HEALTH TREATMENT IN STATE PRISONS, 2000, at 1–2, 5 (2001), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhtsp00.pdf; see also NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PROVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS 2 (2001), available at 
http://static.nicic.gov/Library/016724.pdf; Humberto Temporini, Conducting Mental Health 
Assessments in Correctional Settings, in HANDBOOK OF CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH, 119, 
129–39 (Charles L. Scott ed., 2d ed. 2010).  For a description of the initial medical screen conducted 
at intake and subsequent medical examination in the federal prison system, see Ellis et al., supra 
note 4, at 67. 
 28. See BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 27, at 2.  For a detailed discussion of the variety of 
approaches to the intake process that state correctional agencies employ, see PATRICIA L. 
HARDYMAN ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF CORR., PRISONER INTAKE SYSTEMS (2004), available at 
http://static.nicic.gov/Library/019033.pdf. 
 29. See Temporini, supra note 27, at 130, 135. 
 30. HARDYMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 10–11. 
 31. See id. at 10; Temporini, supra note 27, at 135. 
 32. See HARDYMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 10 (“Generally, the screen consists of a brief 
interview by mental health staff. Depending on the results, the mental health staff may complete 
one or more psychological tests, such as the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI), the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
(WAIS).”); see also  HILLS ET AL., supra note 6, at 14. 
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If the evaluator believes that an inmate is likely to have one or more 
psychiatric disorders, she will refer the inmate to a mental health professional 
for further evaluation and testing.33  According to the American Psychiatric 
Association’s guidelines, this “second-level triage”34 should take place within 
seventy-two hours of referral and consist of a “brief mental health assessment” 
tailored to “the particular, suspected level of services needed.”35  Finally, for 
inmates with serious treatment needs, a psychiatrist or other appropriately 
credentialed mental health professional should perform a comprehensive mental 
health evaluation within a time frame appropriate to the offender’s level of 
urgency.36  This thorough evaluation consists of a face-to-face interview and a 
review of the inmate’s health care records and collateral information.37  The 
evaluation usually concludes with a diagnostic formulation and an initial 
treatment plan.38 
While inmates who screen positive for mental disorder will undergo 
additional assessment, few safety nets exist for prisoners whose mental health 
problems are not recognized or cognizable at the initial screening point.39  Legal 
commentators have urged prisons to conduct a subsequent screen to identify 
inmates whose disorders were not initially detected or who have developed 
mental health problems during the course of their confinement.40  However, 
prisons typically do not conduct a second screen for all inmates,41 but instead 
rely on post-classification referrals to detect mental health disorders that 
manifest after admission.42  Regrettably, anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
                                                 
 33. HARDYMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 10; HILLS ET AL., supra note 6, at 14; NAT’L INST. 
OF CORR., supra note 27, at 2; Temporini, supra note 27, at 135–36. 
 34. Temporini, supra note 27, at 139. 
 35. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES IN JAILS AND PRISONS 43–44 (2d ed. 
2000). 
 36. Id. at 44. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH 
MENTAL ILLNESS 102 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/usa1003.pdf 
(“In many prisons, there is no routine monitoring of [the] mental health of prisoners who are not 
on [the] mental health caseload, even when the prisoners are in notoriously stressful settings such 
as segregation that can prompt mental health crises.”). 
 40. See, e.g., Bonnie J. Sultan, The Insanity of Incarceration and the Maddening Reentry 
Process: A Call for Change and Justice for Males with Mental Illness in United States Prisons, 13 
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 357, 374 (2006) (advocating for making treatment options 
available to inmates who develop mental illnesses while in prison). 
 41. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 101–02; Temporini, supra note 27, at  
137–38. 
 42. See Temporini, supra note 27, at 137–38. 
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referral process is woefully deficient43 because seriously ill inmates often fail to 
self-report.44  Further, correctional officers tend to misinterpret symptomatic 
illness as disorderly conduct, and thus only report inmates who pose security 
threats.45  One court observed that “custody staff essentially make medical 
judgments that should be reserved for clinicians, and some inmates are not given 
appropriate early treatment that could prevent or alleviate a severe psychiatric 
disorder.”46 
B.  Shortcomings in Initial Screening Procedures 
Multiple shortcomings mar correctional agencies’ mental health screening 
processes.  Some deficiencies involve failures in implementation, while other 
problems are structural in nature. 
First, while the vast majority of prison facilities report administering mental 
health screens within a day of admission,47 they do not necessarily do so in a 
comprehensive manner or under conditions likely to generate accurate results.  
For instance, in Coleman v. Wilson, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of California found that the California Department of Corrections’s 
mental health screening processes “are either used haphazardly, or depend for 
efficacy on incomplete or non-existent medical records, self-reporting, or the 
observations of custodial staff inadequately trained in the signs and symptoms 
of mental illness.”48  According to the court, thousands of inmates suffer from 
                                                 
 43. See, e.g., Richard L. Elliott, Evaluating the Quality of Correctional Mental Health 
Services: An Approach to Surveying a Correctional Mental Health System, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 
427, 435 (1997); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 101. 
 44. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1218 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting that an 
individual’s mental illness may affect his ability to recognize his disorder or seek assistance). 
 45. See Jamie Fellner, A Corrections Quandary: Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 396–97 (2006) (explaining that correctional officers often cannot 
distinguish between the actions of a disgruntled inmate and a mentally ill inmate); see also HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 75–76; W. David Ball, Mentally Ill Prisoners in the California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation: Strategies for Improving Treatment and Reducing 
Recidivism, 24 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 16–17 (2007); Johnston, supra note 2, at  
169–74. 
 46. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1219. 
 47. See JAMES AUSTIN & KENNETH MCGINNIS, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., CLASSIFICATION OF 
HIGH-RISK AND SPECIAL MANAGEMENT PRISONERS 45 (2004), available at 
http://static.nicic.gov/Library/019468.pdf; HARDYMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 10.  The Bureau 
of Justice Statistics found that maximum and medium security facilities were more likely than 
minimum security facilities to screen inmates at intake and conduct psychiatric assessments.  See 
BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 27, at 2 tbl.2. (finding that minimum security facilities conducted 
psychiatric assessments approximately sixty-two percent of the time, compared to eighty-four 
percent at medium security facilities  and approximately eighty-eight percent at maximum security 
facilities). 
 48. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1305–06 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
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undetected or untreated mental illnesses.49  In 2005, despite a court order 
directing the Department to improve the assessment process,50 the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of California concluded that the state’s prisoner 
intake system “fails to adequately identify and treat the health care problems of 
new prisoners.”51  The court observed that intake evaluators typically 
administered health screens in less than half of the amount of adequate time 
(seven minutes instead of fifteen minutes).52  Perhaps even more egregiously, 
screeners sometimes assessed inmates in groups, without regard to their 
confidentiality or unwillingness to share sensitive information in a group 
setting.53 
Second, the quality of screening instruments varies among facilities.54  
Federal reports warn that some prison facilities administer incomprehensive 
tests that have neither been verified nor tested on representative prisoner 
populations.55  A 2007 report by the U.S. Department of Justice’s National 
Institute of Justice observed that “screening procedures are highly variable; they 
may consist of anything from one or two questions about previous treatment to 
a detailed, structured mental status examination.”56  Additional studies show that 
the brief screening tests developed specifically for correctional settings fail to 
identify one out of every four offenders with a previously undetected mental 
disorder.57  Other tests may yield even less impressive results.58 
Third, limitations inherent to the assessment process inhibit evaluators’ 
abilities to accurately detect inmates with mental health needs.  Initial mental 
health assessments may rely almost exclusively on information the inmate 
                                                 
 49. Id. at 1306. 
 50. See id. at 1323–24. 
 51. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 TEH, 2005 WL 2932253, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 
3, 2005).  For an analysis of this case and deficiencies in California prisons’ assessment processes, 
see Ball, supra note 45, at 7–10. 
 52. Plata, 2005 WL 2932253, at *12 (assessing the constitutional sufficiency of all health 
screens conducted at California prisons, not just mental health assessments). 
 53. Id. at *13. 
 54. See HILLS ET AL., supra note 6, at 14 (recognizing that, although mental health screening 
is a legal and practical necessity, “[d]etermining how to screen and the methods to use remains 
challenging”). 
 55. See, e.g., HARDYMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 14. 
 56. JULIAN FORD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH SCREENS FOR 
CORRECTIONS 1–2 (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/216152.pdf. 
 57. Temporini, supra note 27, at 132 (reporting that standardized screening methods, such as 
the Correctional Mental Health Screen and the Brief Jail Mental Health Screen, are approximately 
seventy-five percent effective at accurately identifying individuals with previously undetected 
mental disorders). 
 58. See, e.g., Linda A. Teplin, Detecting Disorder: The Treatment of Mental Illness Among 
Jail Detainees, 58 J. OF CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 233 (1990) (finding that 62.5% of 
inmates with acute mental illnesses were missed by routine screening and not treated). 
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communicates to the evaluator through speech or behavior.59  However, inmates 
with serious mental disorders may be unwilling or unable to communicate 
accurate information about their mental health status or history.  Many inmates 
are aware that individuals who manifest bizarre thoughts or behavior may face 
adverse consequences, such as being placed on suicide watch, sent to 
administrative lockdown, forcibly administered medication, or preyed upon by 
other inmates.60  In addition, an inmate’s mental illness, low intelligence, mental 
retardation, or lack of verbal skills may hamper his ability to communicate his 
symptoms effectively.61  Moreover, inmates who lack access to the psychiatric 
medication necessary to enable ordered thought or effective communication may 
not be able to remember or convey relevant information.62  Experts warn that 
evaluators may misinterpret an inmate’s inability to communicate as intentional 
malingering or an attempt to be manipulative.63  In addition, anosognosia, or 
refusal to acknowledge one’s disorder,64 is a common symptom of some serious 
mental illnesses,65 and inmates may go to great lengths to hide their maladies as 
a manifestation of their disorders.66  Finally, co-occurring substance abuse 
disorders, head injuries, and developmental disorders can complicate diagnoses 
and treatment.67  In this setting, accurate detection of mental disorder may 
depend upon an evaluator’s level of training.  However, mental health 
professionals with extensive training in assessment and diagnosis, such as 
psychologists and psychiatrists, rarely conduct mental health screenings.  
Instead, the screens are often performed more economically—and perhaps less 
effectively68—by nurses, counselors, or social workers.69 
Finally, intake evaluators often lack access to records or reports that could 
provide a more accurate picture of an inmate’s mental health status.  Evaluators 
                                                 
 59. See Ball, supra note 45, at 8 (observing that mental health screens in California prisons 
“fail to incorporate objective factors alongside self-reporting”). 
 60. HILLS ET AL., supra note 6, at 14–15. 
 61. See id. at 15; Ball, supra note 45, at 8. 
 62. See Ball, supra note 45, at 7–8. 
 63. HILLS ET AL., supra note 6, at 15. 
 64. VESNA MILDNER, THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE OF HUMAN COMMUNICATION 253 
(2008). 
 65. See, e.g., E. FULLER TORREY, THE INSANITY OFFENSE 112 (2012) (noting that 
approximately half of all individuals with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder have impaired 
awareness of their illness). 
 66. HILLS ET AL., supra note 6, at 5; Anosognosia Keeps Patients From Realizing They’re Ill, 
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (Sept. 7, 2001), http://journals.psychiatryonline.org/newsarticle 
.aspx?articleid=103404. 
 67. See HILLS ET AL., supra note 6, at 5. 
 68. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1219 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“The [medical technical 
assistants] who briefly screen incoming inmates typically do not have the necessary training and 
background to recognize psychiatric illnesses.”). 
 69. NAT’L INST. OF CORR., supra note 27, at 3. 
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commonly do not have the results of prior psychiatric evaluations, even those 
conducted in connection with a competency examination, insanity proceeding, 
or pretrial detention.70  Inmates usually do not bring medication containers, 
prescriptions, or copies of their medical records to a diagnostic center.71  In 
addition, mental health screens are often uninformed by jail evaluation and 
treatment records, even though state law may require that these records 
accompany an inmate upon transfer.72  An evaluator may even complete an 
initial assessment and classification without access to a presentence report.73  
Without this data, screeners must rely on inmates’ willingness and ability to 
share information about their mental health.  Consequently, prisoners’ mental 
disorders can go undetected.74 
C.  Treatment, Housing, and Vulnerability 
Even when evaluators do detect a mental disorder, prisons often fail to provide 
the treatment and the protective environment necessary to prevent disordered 
offenders from experiencing serious harm.  In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that prisoners have an Eighth Amendment right to reasonably adequate 
medical care.75  Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue, 
circuit courts of appeals have extended this holding to psychiatric and 
psychological care.76  In Ruiz v. Estelle, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas outlined six guidelines that correctional institutions must meet 
to satisfy the Eighth Amendment.77  Under these guidelines, prisons must 
maintain a systematic screening and evaluation program to identify inmates who 
                                                 
 70. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 101.  Electronic record-keeping may 
ameliorate this critical deficiency. 
 71. See Ball, supra note 45, at 7; Temporini, supra note 27, at 133–34. 
 72. See Ball, supra note 45, at 7. 
 73. HARDYMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 13 (observing that, while “[i]nformation typically 
contained in a presentence investigation report is critical to conducting a comprehensive and 
complete initial assessment[,] . . . [m]any states reported . . . that these data are not received in a 
timely manner and sometimes arrive after the prisoner has been transferred from the intake facility 
to another prison”). 
 74. See JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 6, at 9 (reporting that, although most prisons provide 
mental health services, only thirty-four percent of state prisoners and twenty-four percent of federal 
prisoners who had a mental health problem actually received mental health treatment after 
admission). 
 75. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep’t 
of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989) (recognizing that prisoners have a right to health care 
under both the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause). 
 76. Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47–48 (4th Cir. 1977); cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 
U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (“[T]he State is under a duty to provide [an individual with mental retardation 
involuntarily confined to a mental institution] with such training as an appropriate professional 
would consider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function free from 
bodily restraints.”). 
 77. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1980). 
2014] Conditions of Confinement at Sentencing 637 
require mental health treatment, provide treatment beyond segregation or close 
supervision, employ a sufficient number of trained mental health professionals 
for individualized treatment, keep accurate and confidential records, properly 
administer medications, and identify and treat inmates at risk for suicide.78  
Several courts and correctional organizations have embraced the Ruiz criteria as 
the standard for constitutionally adequate mental health care in correctional 
settings.79 
Prisons generally apply the principle of least eligibility, deliberately 
maintaining the level of health care a step below the services that the government 
provides to the non-incarcerated population that relies on public assistance.80  
Under this principle, “the level of prison conditions should always compare 
unfavorably to the material living standards of the laboring poor,”81 because 
prisoners “are the least eligible or least deserving members of society for any 
free benefit from the government.”82  Given their cost, older psychiatric 
medications—which often have more side effects and lower rates of compliance 
than newer medications—are the treatment modality of choice inside prisons.83  
Additionally, although the vast majority of prisons report providing some form 
of psychotherapy or counseling,84 they must limit their distribution of this 
                                                 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Fred Cohen, Legal Issues and the Mentally Disordered Inmate, in NAT’L INST. OF 
CORR., SOURCE BOOK ON THE MENTALLY DISORDERED PRISONER 32, 48 (1985); Kim P. Turner, 
Raising the Bars: A Comparative Look at Treatment Standards for Mentally Ill Prisoners in the 
United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 409, 424 & n.66 
(2008). 
 80. FRANK SCHMALLEGER & JOHN ORTIZ SMYKLA, CORRECTIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
205 (2001). 
 81. Richard Sparks, Penal “Austerity”: The Doctrine of Less Eligibility Reborn?, in PRISONS 
2000, at 74 (R. Matthews & P. Francis eds., 1996). 
 82. Brandon K. Applegate, Penal Austerity: Perceived Utility, Desert, and Public Attitudes 
Toward Prison Amenities, 25 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 253, 256 (2001). 
 83. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 115–17, 121–25 (detailing the limited 
access to newer medications within some prison systems and examining the side effects of older 
antipsychotic medications, which some prisons fail to appropriately monitor);  
Adams & Ferrandino, supra note 6, at 922; see also NAT’L INST. OF CORR., supra note 27, at 4 
(reporting that all forty-nine departments of corrections responding to the survey treat mentally ill 
inmates with psychotropic medication). 
 84. See BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 27, at 2 tbl.1 (reporting that eighty-four percent of 
state adult confinement facilities provide therapy). 
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expensive service.85  Consequently, many inmates do not receive the therapy 
that they need to cope effectively in prison.86 
The default rule within many state correctional agencies, as well as the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, is to house inmates with major mental disorders within the 
general prison population at the appropriate security level.87  Inspired by the 
ideals epitomized in the Americans with Disabilities Act,88 these jurisdictions 
“mainstream” inmates with serious mental illnesses.89  Theoretically, this 
housing arrangement could facilitate equality of opportunity, full participation 
in programs, and independent living for disordered individuals.90  However, 
because the general prison environment is antitherapeutic, this approach has 
engendered criticism.91 
                                                 
 85. See NAT’L INST. OF CORR., supra note 27, at 4–5 (reporting that fourteen departments of 
corrections typically provide inmates with non-acute mental illnesses with less than one hour per 
week of counseling, ten departments typically provide these inmates with one hour of counseling 
per week, four departments provide more than one hour of counseling per week, and nine 
departments provide therapy based on an individual prisoner’s need). 
 86. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 109–14 (detailing the limited provision of 
therapeutic interventions in many prison systems); Sally J. MacKain & Charles E. Messer, Ending 
the Inmate Shuffle: An Intermediate Care Program for Inmates with a Chronic Mental Illness, 4 J. 
FORENSIC PYSCHOL. PRAC. 87, 89 (2004) (observing that “few inmates receive care beyond the 
prescriptions of medication or assignments to separate housing”). 
 87. See BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 27, at 1, 4; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 
39, at 128.  For a detailed examination of placement decisions and treatment afforded in U.S. 
prisons, see ELLIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 28–29. 
 88. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 89. See Fellner, supra note 45, at 394 (“Apart from the mental health services that may or 
may not be provided, prisons typically treat prisoners with mental illness identically to all other 
inmates. There are no special allowances. Officials confine them in the same facilities, expect them 
to follow the same routines, and require them to comply with the same rules.”); see also U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Institution Management of Mentally Ill Inmates § 6, at 3 
(Program Statement 5310.13) (1995), available at http://www.bop. 
gov/policy/progstat/5310_013.pdf (“To ensure consistent treatment throughout the system, each 
institution shall develop a comprehensive approach for managing mentally ill inmates which 
emphasizes the management of these cases in a regular correctional setting, rather than in a 
hospitalized setting, as the preferred treatment strategy whenever and wherever feasible.”). 
 90. See Judy Anderson, Special Needs Offenders, in PRISON AND JAIL ADMINISTRATION 219, 
220 (Peter M. Carlson & Judith Simon Garrett eds., 1999). 
 91. See, e.g., CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., MENTAL HEALTH IN THE HOUSE OF CORRECTIONS 43 
(2004), available at http://www.correctionalassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2004/06/Mental 
-Health.pdf (identifying “the overarching problem with the provision of mental health care in New 
York State prisons [as] the attempt of [the Office of Mental Health] to superimpose the community 
mental health model on the correctional system” and arguing that this model is inapt because “in 
the correctional system . . . not only is outpatient care sorely lacking in ‘the community’ of the 
general prison population, the violence and chaos of prison life itself can destabilize even mentally 
balanced individuals”); Shelia M. B. Holton, Managing and Treating Mentally Disordered 
Offenders in Jails and Prisons, in CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH HANDBOOK 101, 109–10 
(Thomas J. Fagan & Robert K. Ax eds., 2003) (arguing that mentally ill inmates in a mainstreamed 
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Confinement within the general prison population can be seriously damaging 
for an inmate with a major mental disorder.92  As a preliminary matter, this high-
stress environment exacerbates the symptoms of many serious mental illnesses 
and can cause cognitive degeneration.93  Moreover, recent studies demonstrate 
that individuals with serious mental illnesses, unable to sufficiently assess 
danger and modify their behavior to ward off attacks, are more prone to physical 
and sexual victimization than non-disordered individuals.94  In addition, strict 
compliance with prison rules can be difficult for individuals with mental and 
behavioral limitations, and prisoners with serious mental illnesses are more 
likely than non-disordered prisoners to violate prison rules.95  As a result, 
mentally ill prisoners are disproportionately punished in solitary confinement,96 
where they may be especially susceptible to decompensation, psychotic break, 
and suicide ideation.97 
                                                 
environment are likely to isolate themselves through withdrawal and enter the cycle of segregation); 
cf. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 133 (discussing why deinstitutionalization and the 
community mental health model are problematic in the prison context). 
 92. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 53; Marshall T. Bewley & Robert D. 
Morgan, A National Survey of Mental Health Services Available to Offenders with Mental Illness: 
Who is Doing What?, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 351, 352 (2010); Richard C. McCorkle, Gender, 
Psychopathology, and Institutional Behavior: A Comparison of Male and Female Mentally Ill 
Prison Inmates, 23 J. CRIM. JUST. 53, 54 (1995). 
 93. See Jamie Fellner, A Conundrum for Corrections, A Tragedy for Prisoners: Prisons as 
Facilities for the Mentally Ill, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 135, 139–40 (2006) (explaining that the 
general prison environment can worsen a mental illness to the point at which hospitalization is 
necessary); Holton, supra note 91, at 108–10. 
 94. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 161–69 & nn.64–83, 91–103 (physical and sexual assault); 
ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS 
REPORTED BY INMATES, 2011–12, at 24–25, 27–29 (2013), available at http://www.bjs. 
gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri1112.pdf (sexual victimization). 
 95. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 170–74 nn.114–34 (citing several studies reporting that 
mentally disordered inmates have trouble following prison rules). 
 96. See id. at 174–76 & nn.146–49.  A 2004 report by the National Institute of Corrections 
found that forty-seven percent of states reported subjecting disruptive mentally ill inmates to the 
same maximum-custody policies as non-disordered inmates.  AUSTIN & MCGINNIS, supra note 47, 
at 37. 
 97. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 176–78 & nn.150–55.  Conversely, a recent study led in 
part by the Colorado Department of Corrections concluded that confinement in administrative 
segregation does not induce significant cognitive or psychological decline in inmates with or 
without pre-existing mental disorders.  See Maureen O’Keefe et al., A Longitudinal Study of 
Administrative Segregation, 41 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 49, 54–59 (2013).  However, other 
researchers have identified a number of methodological flaws in the study.  See Stuart Grassian, 
“Fatal Flaws” in the Colorado Solitary Confinement Study, SOLITARY WATCH (Nov. 15, 2010), 
http://solitarywatch.com/2010/11/15/fatal-flaws-in-the-colorado-solitary-confinement-study/.  
More research is necessary to determine how variations in conditions of confinement 
—such as the physical layout of cells, access to personal effects, and programming opportunities—
may affect the mental health of prisoners with and without preexisting serious mental illness.  See 
Adams & Ferrandino, supra note 6, at 921; Carl B. Clements et al., Systemic Issues and 
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Because seriously disordered offenders are particularly vulnerable to 
predation, prisons may house these inmates in isolation as a means of protection.  
Through a process called external classification, correctional authorities—based 
largely on information collected at intake—determine a prisoner’s custody level 
(minimum, medium, or maximum) and his facility placement.98  Once the 
prisoner is placed in a facility, correctional officials typically undertake the 
process of internal classification, which determines the appropriate housing for 
an individual of a particular custody level and the programming and resources 
he requires.99  Although aspects of inmate classification have become 
increasingly objective over time,100 facilities still base protective custody 
decisions on the subjective judgments of correctional officials.101  Prison 
classification experts recognize that these subjective assessments may yield 
arbitrary determinations with tragic results.102  Ironically, the housing 
arrangement designed to protect vulnerable inmates from general-population 
predators may introduce a different, but equally significant, danger.  Protective 
custody places inmates in highly restrictive housing that resembles disciplinary 
isolation, in which offenders are secluded for twenty-one to twenty-four hours 
                                                 
Correctional Outcomes: Expanding the Scope of Correctional Psychology, 34 CRIM. JUST. & 
BEHAV. 919, 925–26 (2007). 
 98. AUSTIN & MCGINNIS, supra note 47, at 7.  For an explanation of the Bureau of Prisons’s 
designation process, see ELLIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 29–37; see also Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. 
Dep’t. of Justice, Inmate Security Designation and Custody Classification (2006) (Program 
Statement No. 5100.08), available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5100_008.pdf 
(governing the designation of an inmate to a specific institution). 
 99. See PATRICIA L. HARDYMAN ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTERNAL PRISON 
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS 1–2 (2002), available at http://www.jfa-associates.com/publications 
/pcras/05_Internal.pdf. 
 100. See AUSTIN & MCGINNIS, supra note 47, at 1. 
 101. See id. at 7–8; HARDYMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 11; NAT’L PRISON RAPE 
ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 76–77. 
 102. See, e.g., AUSTIN & MCGINNIS, supra note 47, at 7–8 (“Unfortunately, professional 
judgment has been shown to be by far the least accurate risk assessment method.”); James Austin, 
External and Internal Classification, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS PRISON 
CLASSIFICATION PEER TRAINING AND STRATEGY SESSION 5, 7 (2001), available at 
http://static.nicic.gov/Library/016707.pdf  (“Currently, most prisons systems have less structured 
internal classification systems which can often result in serious incidents or high-profile escapes. 
Often, inmates are inappropriately housed, programmed or improperly separated.”).  However, 
under the Prison Rape Elimination Act, all facilities must assess prisoners with an objective 
screening instrument during an intake screening for their risk of sexual victimization by other 
inmates.  See 28 C.F.R. § 115.41 (2013).  For a description of several actuarial-based risk 
assessment instruments, see AUSTIN & MCGINNIS, supra note 47, at 15–23. 
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per day.103  Evidence suggests that individuals with serious mental disorders 
often deteriorate in this restrictive environment.104 
If a prisoner reaches a state of crisis or an acute state of mental illness, prison 
authorities typically transfer him to an acute crisis unit for inpatient mental 
health services.105  Stays in these units are temporary; the goal is to treat and 
stabilize the inmate for return to the general population or, perhaps, a residential 
treatment unit.106  Criteria for admission match those required for involuntary 
civil commitment,107 and treatment resembles that available in an inpatient 
psychiatric hospital, with significant psychotherapy and pharmaceutical 
regimens.108 
In addition, some states house mentally ill inmates in separate units or 
facilities for longer periods of time, especially when inmates cannot function 
adequately or cope within the general prison population.109  One report, based 
on the 2000 Census of State and Federal Adult Correctional Facilities, revealed 
the existence of 155 facilities, located in forty-seven states, that provide mental 
health or psychiatric confinement as a “special function.”110  Facility 
administrators specified that mental health confinement was the primary 
function of twelve facilities and a secondary function of 143 facilities.111  While 
some states restrict their use of these special accommodations to short-term 
                                                 
 103. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS 31 (2001); 
Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2011); 
Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and ‘Supermax’ Confinement, 49 CRIME 
& DELINQ. 124, 135 (2003); James E. Robertson, The Constitution in Protective Custody: An 
Analysis of the Rights of Protective Custody Inmates, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 91, 91 (1987). 
 104. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 176–77. 
 105. See CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note 91, at 41; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, 
at 128. 
 106. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 128.  For more information on residential 
treatment units, or intermediate care facilities, see infra Part IV.E. 
 107. See, e.g., VA. DEP’T OF CORR., OPERATING PROCEDURE 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.vadoc.state.va.us/about/procedures/documents/700/730-3.pdf (“Involuntary admission 
proceedings shall be initiated when the offender has a mental illness and there exists a substantial 
likelihood that, as a result of the mental illness, the offender will, in the near future: (i) Cause 
serious physical harm to himself or herself as evidenced by recent behavior causing, or attempting, 
or threatening harm and other relevant information or (ii) Cause serious physical harm to others as 
evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening harm and other relevant 
information or (iii) Suffer serious harm due to his/her lack of capacity to protect himself or herself 
from harm or to provide for his/her basic human needs, and (iv) Alternatives to involuntary 
admission have been investigated and deemed unsuitable and there is no less restrictive alternative 
to such an admission.”). 
 108. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 128. 
 109. See NAT’L INST. OF CORR., supra note 27, at 5–6. 
 110. BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 27, at 2; see also NAT’L INST. OF CORR., supra note 
27, at 6–7 (reporting that thirty-three states, the Bureau of Prisons, Puerto Rico, and Guam provide 
separate housing units for inmates with mental disorders in at least one institution). 
 111. BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 27, at 4 tbl.5. 
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housing for inmates suffering from acute episodes, others report utilizing 
facilities as long-term segregated housing for inmates with mental disorders.112 
One increasingly popular correctional option involves the use of intermediate 
care facilities or residential treatment units, which are designed to assist mentally 
disordered inmates who are unable to function adequately in the general prison 
population.  These units aim to provide prisoners with effective clinical care and 
coping skills.113  No recent report catalogues every state that maintains 
intermediate care units,114 but research reveals the existence of units in New 
York,115 Washington,116 Ohio,117 North Carolina,118 Virginia,119 Kansas,120 New 
Mexico,121 Mississippi,122 Vermont,123 Alabama,124 California,125 and 
Wyoming.126  These units are associated with lower levels of mental disorder, 
disciplinary violations, and victimization, and may yield aggregate cost savings 
for prisons.127  Given the widely touted success of these units, other states may 
                                                 
 112. Id. at 4; see also Holton, supra note 91, at 115–16 (describing the conditions in mental 
health treatment units). 
 113. See BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 27, at 4. 
 114. See 1 NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, THE HEALTH STATUS OF SOON-TO-BE-
RELEASED INMATES xii & xxi n.22 (2002), available at https://www.ncjrs. 
gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/189735.pdf (reporting, based on a 1992 study, that only thirty-six percent 
of prisons have specialized housing for inmates with stable mental health conditions). 
 115. CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note 91, at 35. 
 116. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR., MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT SERVICES 3 (2008), available at 
http://www.doc.wa.gov/aboutdoc/docs/p351gmentalhealthtreatmentservicesfactsheet.pdf. 
 117. OHIO DEP’T OF REHAB. & CORR., RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT UNITS 2 (2010) [hereinafter 
Ohio DRC], available at http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/drc_policies/documents/67-MNH-23.pdf. 
 118. MacKain & Messer, supra note 86, at 91–92. 
 119. VA. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 107, at 3, 5–6. 
 120. Larned Correctional Mental Health Facility, KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 
http://www.doc.ks.gov/facilities/lcmhf (last modified Dec. 7, 2012, 7:55 AM). 
 121. N.M. CORR. DEP’T, MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT CENTER: PSYCHIATRY, MEDICAL, 
AND NURSING CARE 2, 4–7 (2012), available at http://corrections.state.nm.us/policies/docs/CD-
172300.pdf (operating procedure). 
 122. Terry A. Kupers et al., Beyond Supermax Administrative Segregation: Mississippi’s 
Experience Rethinking Prison Classification and Creating Alternative Mental Health Programs, 
36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1038 (2009). 
 123. VT. DEP’T OF CORR., RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT PROGRAMS 2 (1997), available at 
http://www.doc.state.vt.us/about/policies/rpd/correctional-services-301-550/361-370-programs 
-treatment-programs/361.01.09%20Residential%20Tx%20Programs.pdf. 
 124. ALA. DEP’T OF CORR., TREATMENT PLANNING 4 (2010), available at 
http://www.doc.state.al.us/docs/AdminRegs/AR622.pdf. 
 125. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 131. 
 126. WIS. DEP’T OF CORR. & DEP’T OF HEALTH SERV., AN EVALUATION: INMATE MENTAL 
HEALTH CARE 51–61 (2009), available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lab/reports/09-4full.pdf 
(Wisconsin Resource Center). 
 127. See infra notes 276–80 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of intermediate 
care units). 
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choose to invest in this mode of treatment to the extent they have not done so 
already.128 
II.  LEGITIMACY OF RECOGNIZING VULNERABILITY AT SENTENCING 
Offender vulnerability is an appropriate consideration for sentencing.  
Allowing judges to tailor disordered offenders’ prison sentences in light of their 
vulnerabilites would enable judges to better fulfill their institutional function and 
achieve the goals of punishment.129  A sanction that is appropriate for an 
offender without a disability may be wholly excessive, criminogenic, or even 
inhumane for an offender lacking the cognitive or behavioral capabilities needed 
to cope within a given punitive environment.  Traditional theories of punishment 
help to justify the consideration of an offender’s susceptibility to serious harm 
or need for treatment at sentencing.  Although additional justifications may 
exist,130 consideration of offender vulnerability may be critical to effectuating 
the retributive or rehabilitative purposes of a criminal sentence.  Collateral 
benefits would attend the accomodation of offender vulnerability as well. 
A.  Retributive Rationales 
Two retributive rationales support the notion that a judge should have the 
authority to tailor an offender’s carceral sentence to meet his mental health 
treatment needs or to mitigate hardship in prison.  First, a retributive 
understanding of punishment suggests that a sentencing system should consider 
an offender’s vulnerability to avoid imposing an inhumane punishment.  
                                                 
 128. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 130 (citing Dr. Jeffrey Metzner as stating 
that “Michigan, Ohio, Georgia, New York, Vermont, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, Colorado, and 
Kansas have all taken steps towards creating networks of sub-acute care facilities”).  Correctional 
agencies do not employ consistent terminology for these units, and it can be difficult to discern the 
long- or short-term nature of mental health units included in government reports.  See NAT’L INST. 
OF CORR., supra note 27, at 6–7 (listing ways in which mental health units may be characterized).  
Intermediate care facilities are detailed in Part IV.E below. 
 129. The U.S. Constitution does not assign the sentencing power to one branch of government, 
and all three branches may properly play a role in sentencing.  See Kieran Riley, Trial By 
Legislature: Why Statutory Mandatory Minimum Sentences Violate the Separation of Powers 
Doctrine, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 285, 302 (2010).  Sentencing constitutes one of those “zones of 
twilight” in which the distribution of power between the separate branches of government overlaps 
and is uncertain.  See Jordan Fried, Note, The Constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission: 
An Analysis of the Role of the Judiciary, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 704, 712–13 (1989) (quoting 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)); see 
also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989). 
 130. Offender hardship would also factor into utilitarian proportionality conceptions.  See, e.g., 
Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: 
“Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 592–97 (2005); E. THOMAS 
SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW 161–66 
(2009).  It could also be relevant to theories of mercy. 
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Premised upon respect for the moral dignity and personhood of the offender,131 
retributivism will not tolerate punishments that violate human dignity,132 fail to 
recognize the personality of offenders,133 or “approximate a system of sheer 
terror in which human beings are treated as animals to be intimated and 
prodded.”134 
Determining when, exactly, a mode of punishment or conditions associated 
with a particular sanction cross the line from harsh to inhumane is a difficult 
contextual question that ultimately reflects the sensitivities and values of a 
particular society.135  While corporal punishment was once commonplace, much 
of the civilized world now rejects corporal sanctions, such as whipping and 
lashing, as inhumane.136  The same holds true for sanctions intended to 
profoundly disrupt one’s personality or senses or to precipitate mental crisis.137  
Philosophers, legal scholars, and courts distinguish incarceration from corporal 
sanctions by emphasizing the former’s primary function as a deprivation of 
                                                 
 131. See BARBARA A. HUDSON, UNDERSTANDING JUSTICE 51 (2003) (characterizing 
Immanuel Kant’s moral theory as resting “on a model of the human as someone whose actions are 
the result of moral choices”); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
217–20, 229–31 (1973) (outlining Immanuel Kant’s theory of punishment, with an emphasis on its 
manifestation of respect for dignity, autonomy, rationality, and rights). 
 132. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 233 (1979). 
 133. See id. (decrying “a punishment which is in itself degrading, which treats the prisoner as 
an animal instead of a human being, which perhaps even is an attempt to reduce him to an animal 
or a mere thing” as inconsistent with human dignity). 
 134. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 488 (1968); see also Markel 
& Flanders, supra note 17, at 958 (“To literally or psychologically break or destroy a person under 
the aegis of retributive punishment would violate the offender’s dignity, and, in a democracy, our 
own.”). 
 135. See, e.g., JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 123 (1973); David Garland, 
Sociological Perspectives on Punishment, 14 CRIME & JUST. 115, 143 (1991).  This moral question 
parallels the legal inquiry of whether punishment is cruel and unusual under the Eighth 
Amendment.  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 838-42 (1994) (holding that, to establish 
an Eighth Amendment claim for conditions of confinement, an inmate must demonstrate that the 
responsible prison official acted with “deliberate indifference” towards his health or safety by 
knowing of the existence of conditions that pose “a substantial risk of serious harm” and failing to 
take reasonable measures to abate the risk).  Arguably, “retributive theory, with its focus on justice, 
morality, and the dignity of the offender can and should be more sensitive to risk of physical and 
psychological harm than current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”  Johnston, supra note 2, at 
213 n.314. 
 136. See Ruplekha Khullar, Punishment and Human Rights, in APPLIED ETHICS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 183, 187–88 (Shaski Motilal ed., 2010); Garland, supra note 135, at 143. 
 137. See Hernán Reyes, The Worst Scars Are In the Mind: Psychological Torture, 89 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 591, 594–616 (2007) (defining psychological torture, detailing various methods 
of psychological torture, and describing its effects); see also Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, 
Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 104, 104 (2010) (“Solitary confinement is recognized as difficult to 
withstand; indeed, psychological stressors such as isolation can be as clinically distressing as 
physical torture.”). 
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rights.138  However, a sentence of incarceration that carries an unacceptably high 
likelihood of victimization or psychological harm for a vulnerable prisoner may 
more closely resemble an inhumane corporal penalty than an unobjectionable 
deprivation of rights.139  If this is true, then, when the foreseeable risk of serious 
physical or psychological harm in prison surpasses an acceptable threshold, 
incarceration under a certain set of conditions should no longer be a permissible 
punishment option.140  Thus, when a judge believes that incarceration under 
standard conditions would pose an unacceptable risk of serious harm to a 
particular offender, she should have the authority to select an alternative sanction 
of roughly equivalent punitive bite or to modify the conditions of the offender’s 
confinement so that incarceration is a morally tolerable option.141 
The second justification, as I have argued at length elsewhere, involves the 
application of the principle of equal impact.142  Under a just deserts theory, the 
severity of an offender’s punishment should reflect his culpability and the harm 
that he effected through his criminal act.143  While most scholars measure a 
punishment’s severity by reference to an objective standard,144 some 
commentators have recognized that sanctions such as incarceration have a 
                                                 
 138. See, e.g., J.D. Mabbott, Discussion: Professor Flew on Punishment, 30 PHILOSOPHY 256, 
257 (1955); Alexander A. Reinert, Release as Remedy for Excessive Punishment, 53 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1575, 1588–90 (2012) (observing that terms of incarceration will almost always survive 
scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment); Geoffrey Scarre, Corporal Punishment, 6 ETHICAL 
THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 295, 297 (2003). 
 139. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U 
L. REV. 881, 915–16 (2009); cf. Garland, supra note 135, at 149 (“The crucial difference between 
corporal punishments that are banned, and other punishments—such as long-term imprisonment 
that are routinely used—is not a matter of the intrinsic levels of pain and brutality involved. It is a 
matter of the form which that violence takes, and the extent to which it impinges on public 
sensibilities.”). 
 140. Whether an individual’s risk of harm is intolerable will depend on the particularized risk 
of serious harm that prison poses to the offender.  See Johnston, supra note 2, at 180 (“Statistical 
risk alone, however, may not merit a change in sentencing.”); cf. Kenneth W. Simons, Statistical 
Knowledge Deconstructed, 92 B. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012) (distinguishing between statistical and 
individualized knowledge for purposes of culpability determinations).  Individuals with serious 
mental illnesses often will be able to prove that they face a particularized risk of serious harm from 
incarceration, beyond background statistical rates.  In many instances an individualized showing 
will be possible given prior patterns of behavior, personal history of abuse, and additional risk 
factors that can be brought to a judge’s attention at a sentencing hearing. 
 141. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 216–21. 
 142. See id. at 183–229. 
 143. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING 4–5 
(2005); cf. Meghan J. Ryan, Proximate Retribution, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1049, 1062–64 (2011) 
(distinguishing between harm-based and intent-based means of evaluating an offender’s desert and 
asserting that, “[t]o the extent that American sentencing systems are retribution-based, they are 
often harm-based systems in a number of respects”). 
 144. See, e.g., David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1658 & n.195 
(2010) (“[R]etributivism defines punishment as a restraint on liberty or other consequence that is 
determined and justified objectively by reference to a culpable offense.”). 
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foreseeable, disparate impact on vulnerable classes of offenders, such as the 
elderly, young, physically disabled, and mentally ill.145  In response, scholars, 
including Professors Andrew Ashworth and Andrew von Hirsch, have espoused 
a principle of equal impact, which dictates that, “when an offender suffers from 
certain handicaps that would make his punishment significantly more onerous, 
the sanction should be adjusted in order to avoid its having an undue differential 
impact on him.”146  The equal impact principle thus acknowledges the 
foreseeable, typical, and serious side-effects that certain penalties hold for 
vulnerable populations and seeks to adjust ordered sanctions so that members of 
vulnerable classes receive penalties of roughly equivalent severity as non-
vulnerable individuals.147  Understood properly, the equal impact principle does 
not call for a reduction in punishment, but rather for equalizing the severity of 
penalties imposed on equally blameworthy offenders.148  Therefore, recognition 
of the equal impact principle may be necessary, at least in extreme cases, to 
achieve proportionality in punishment.149 
                                                 
 145. See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth & Elaine Player, Sentencing, Equal Treatment, and the 
Impact of Sanctions, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY 251, 259–60, 274–75 (Andrew 
Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds., 1998); Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing Young Offenders, in 
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 294, 300 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009) (describing the 
disproportionate effects of punishment on young offenders); VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra 
note 143, at 42–43, 172–73, 176 (arguing that incarceration disproportionately affects the young, 
disabled, ill, and elderly); Barry C. Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a 
Revolution that Failed?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 189, 247–48 (2007) (discussing the punishment of 
young offenders); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 44 
(Haffner Press 1948) (1789) (delineating “circumstances influencing sensibility”). 
 146. VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 143, at 172; see also Ashworth & Player, supra 
note 145, at 253 (advocating “a general principle of equal treatment, by which we mean that a 
sentencing system should strive to avoid its punishments having an unequal impact on different 
offenders or groups of offenders”).  The roots of the equal impact theory can be traced to Jeremy 
Bentham.  See BENTHAM, supra note 145, at 182. 
 147. See ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND PENAL POLICY 277 (1983); VON HIRSCH & 
ASHWORTH, supra note 143, at 172–73; see also Johnston, supra note 2, at 194–95 & nn.219–23, 
221–29; Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 2, at 199–200.  This stance may depend upon 
subscription to a definition of punishment that includes foreseeable, substantial risks of serious 
harm, proximately caused by the state during confinement.  See Johnston, supra note 2, at 186–87.  
Traditionally, scholars have defined punishment to include only hardships or deprivations that a 
legitimate sentencing authority both intends and authorizes.  See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau, 
Feinberg’s Liberal Theory of Punishment, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 103, 111–12 (2001); Johnston, 
supra note 2, at 188 n.198 (collecting sources). 
 148. See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 143, at 173. 
 149. See Ashworth & Player, supra note 145, at 255; cf. VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra 
note 143, at 172 (asserting that, although the “‘equal impact’ principle is connected with the 
proportionalist sentencing model, [it] is not part of it in standard cases” and that its use should be 
reserved for “unusual cases that diverge significantly from the norm”). 
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B.  Rehabilitative Rationales 
Two strains of rehabilitative thought could also inspire the consideration of 
mental disorder and vulnerability at sentencing.  The first view echoes the 
understanding of punishment dominant in the United States from the World 
Wars through the 1970s: the state, through criminal punishment, should seek to 
identify and treat the underlying causes of an individual’s criminality.150  
Professor Francis Allen described the “rehabilitative ideal” in this way: 
It is assumed, first, that human behavior is the product of antecedent 
causes. These causes can be identified as part of the physical 
universe[,] and it is the obligation of the scientist to discover and to 
describe them with all possible exactitude. Knowledge of the 
antecedents of human behavior makes possible an approach to the 
scientific control of human behavior. Finally, . . . it is assumed that 
measures employed to treat the convicted offender should serve a 
therapeutic function, that such measures should be designed to effect 
changes in the behavior of the convicted person in the interest of his 
own happiness, health, and satisfaction and in the interest of social 
defense.151 
While the rehabilitative ideal did not specify a single theory of crime 
causation,152 psychiatrists Karl Menninger153 and Benjamin Karpman,154 among 
others,155 embraced a medical model of crime.156  According to this theory, 
criminal behavior is symptomatic of mental illness or personality disorder.157  In 
essence, offenders are considered “sick” and in need of a state-coerced “cure” to 
                                                 
 150. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 2 (1981); Richard 
C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 
1205, 1219–20 (1998). 
 151. Francis A. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values, and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in 
PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 172, 173 (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed., 1973). 
 152. ALLEN, DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL, supra note 150, at 3. 
 153. See, e.g., KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 4–5 (1968) (discussing the 
“science of criminology”); Karl Menninger, Therapy, Not Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND 
REHABILITATION, supra note 150, at 132; Karl Menninger, Medicolegal Proposals of the American 
Psychiatric Association, 19 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 367, 370–71 (1928) 
(detailing several medical and scientific explanations for criminal behavior). 
 154. See, e.g., BENJAMIN KARPMAN, CASE STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME vii 
(1944); BENJAMIN KARPMAN, THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND HIS OFFENSES (1954); Benjamin 
Karpman, Criminal Psychodynamics: A Platform, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra 
note 150, at 118. 
 155. See, e.g., BARBARA WOOTTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1963) (arguing that the 
criminal justice system should serve preventative, not punitive, ends and treat the origins of 
criminality). 
 156. For a description of the tenets and evolution of therapeutic rehabilitation, see E. ROTMAN, 
BEYOND PUNISHMENT 60–63 (1990). 
 157. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Introduction, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra note 
151, at 1, 5; Karpman, supra note 154, at 119. 
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address their underlying sources of criminality.158  Identification and treatment 
of an inmate’s mental disorder, under this perspective, may be essential to 
restoring the offender to his status as a law-abiding citizen.  Evidence suggests, 
however, that offenders with major mental disorders often retain the ability to 
make rational choices and that their criminal behavior often reflects varying 
motivations.159  A less radical and perhaps more defensible view is that the 
treatment and control of symptoms associated with mental illnesses are 
necessary to allow a disordered individual to benefit from programming, which 
has been shown by some studies to hold rehabilitative potential.160 
C.  Collateral Benefits 
Finally, authorizing judges to consider and accommodate offender 
vulnerability at sentencing would carry collateral benefits.  Expressing concern 
for offenders’ actual prison experiences would serve as a means to honor their 
personhood and inherent worth.161  Further, permitting judges to acknowledge 
and respond to foreseeable, substantial risks of harm would hold prisons 
accountable and foster the reform of both prison conditions and correctional 
mental health programs.162  Sustained attention to the plight of vulnerable 
populations in prison could also increase the demand for alternative sentencing 
options, such as home detention with electronic monitoring, halfway houses, 
inpatient and outpatient mental health treatment, and mandatory community 
service.  Many of these noncarceral penalties are much less expensive than 
prison and could offer welcome cost savings.163  Finally, by recognizing 
vulnerability at sentencing, judges could make the criminal justice system more 
just and less cruel. 
                                                 
 158. See ROTMAN, supra note 155, at 5. 
 159. See E. Lea Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 519,  
558–61 (2012) (discussing social scientists’ views of the varying motivations of offenders with 
serious mental illnesses); cf. infra note 237 (citing research suggesting that mental illnesses may 
directly contribute to the criminality of only a small minority of the mentally disordered offending 
population). 
 160. See HILLS ET AL., supra note 6, at 8 (reviewing the rehabilitative benefits of treating 
mentally ill inmates while they are in prison). 
 161. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 195–97. 
 162. See Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139, 141 (2006) 
(“[T]o the extent that sexual coercion in prison cannot be eliminated, we should make that fact part 
of debates about the appropriate use of imprisonment as a penalty.”). 
 163. See LINH VUONG ET AL., NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, THE 
EXTRAVAGANCE OF IMPRISONMENT REVISITED 1–2 (2010), available at http://www.nccd 
global.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/specialreport-extravagance.pdf (analyzing the 
incarcerated populations of four states and the federal prison system to determine the percentage of 
non-serious offenders and concluding that imposing non-carceral sentences on these offenders 
would yield significant cost savings). 
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III.  CURRENT STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS THAT FACTOR VULNERABILITY INTO 
SENTENCING 
At least two statutory frameworks currently authorize sentencing courts to 
consider a disordered offender’s need for treatment and susceptibility to harm in 
prison.164  These statutory schemes permit judges to either replace incarceration 
with commitment for mental health treatment or treat offender vulnerability as 
a mitigating factor weighing in favor of probation or a reduced sentence of 
incarceration.  The statutes reveal the legislative judgment that sentencing 
should reflect a sanction’s foreseeable effects on an offender.  They also suggest 
that judges are competent to evaluate both an offender’s ability to cope within a 
typical prison environment and his likelihood of victimization and mental 
degeneration once he is incarcerated.165  While these efforts are important, they 
are incomplete and ultimately fail to ensure that vulnerable prisoners receive 
proportionate, appropriate, and humane punishments. 
A.  Authority to Commit Defendants for Treatment 
The federal government and a handful of states authorize trial courts to 
commit a defendant for mental health treatment in lieu of incarceration in certain 
circumstances.166  Critically, these statutes apply to defendants who are 
                                                 
 164. The sentencing of juveniles would provide another potential analog.  Many states 
authorize judges to designate certain offenders below a certain age as “youthful offenders”—a 
designation that carries particular placement, programming, and treatment consequences—after 
considering their background, maturity, and prospects for rehabilitation in a juvenile facility versus 
prison.  See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 640.010(2)(b)(1)–(8), (c) (2008);  
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-311–16 (2008 & Supp. 2013); West Virginia v. Brewster, 579 S.E.2d 715, 
717 (W.Va. 2003) (discussing sentencing under West Virginia’s Young Adult Offenders Act). 
 165. See infra notes 205–210 and accompanying text (discussing legislative confidence in 
judges’ evaluations of criminal defendants). 
 166. See 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-607 (LexisNexis 2013) 
(authorizing the court to hospitalize and dismiss the prosecution of a defendant who is “suffering 
from mental abnormality and . . . is subject by law to involuntary hospitalization for medical, 
psychiatric, or other rehabilitative treatment,” if the court “is of the view that it will substantially 
further the rehabilitation of the defendant and will not jeopardize the protection of the public”); 725 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-26(c)(1)-(2) (West 2013) (providing that “[t]he court shall not 
impose a sentence of imprisonment upon [an offender rendered fit for trial through the provision of 
assistance to compensate for his disabilities] if the court believes that because of his disability a 
sentence of imprisonment would not serve the ends of justice and the interests of society and the 
offender or that because of his disability a sentence of imprisonment would subject the offender to 
excessive hardship” and authorizing hospitalization in lieu of incarceration);  
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3429 to -3431 (2012) (authorizing a trial court to commit a defendant for 
psychiatric care if examination reveals “that the defendant is in need of psychiatric care and 
treatment, that such treatment may materially aid in the defendant’s rehabilitation and that the 
defendant and society are not likely to be endangered by permitting the defendant to receive such 
psychiatric care and treatment, in lieu of confinement or imprisonment”); N.D. CENT. CODE  
§ 12.1-32-02(1)(g) (2012) (authorizing, instead of incarceration, “commitment to an appropriate 
licensed public or private institution for treatment of . . . mental disease or defect”); 50 PA. STAT. 
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competent to stand trial or plead guilty and to be sentenced.  The laws allow 
judges to identify defendants whose mental disorders require care outside of 
correctional facilities and to guarantee their placement in a suitable hospital or 
institution. 
For example, 18 U.S.C. § 4244 provides that a trial court prior to sentencing 
shall order a hearing, on motion of counsel or sua sponte,167 if it has “reasonable 
cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental 
disease or defect for the treatment of which he is in need of custody for care or 
treatment in a suitable facility.”168  When the “reasonable cause” standard is met, 
the court must order a hearing.169  After the hearing, if the court finds by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is presently suffering from a 
mental disease or defect and that he should, in lieu of imprisonment, be 
committed to a facility for care or treatment, the court must commit the 
defendant to the custody of the Attorney General.170  The Attorney General will 
then hospitalize the defendant in a suitable facility.171  This commitment 
constitutes a provisional sentence for the maximum term authorized by the 
relevant criminal statute, which likely exceeds the sentence the defendant would 
have received under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.172  If the defendant 
                                                 
ANN. § 4410(c) (West 2001) (“Upon receipt of a report that the defendant is so mentally disabled 
that it is advisable for his welfare or the protection of the community that he be committed to a 
facility, the court may so commit him in lieu of sentence for such period, as may be appropriate 
until further order of the court; but in no event for a period longer than the maximum sentence 
authorized for the crime of which he was adjudged guilty.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27-45 
(2004) (“If, after hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is 
presently suffering from a mental disease or defect and that he should, in lieu of being sentenced to 
imprisonment, be committed to a suitable facility for care or treatment, the court shall commit the 
defendant to the custody of the Human Services Center.”); cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.1055 (West 
2009) (“When a court intends to commit an offender with a serious and persistent mental  
illness . . . to the custody of the commissioner of corrections for imprisonment at a state correctional 
facility [for a term of longer than one year], . . . the court, when consistent with public safety, may 
instead place the offender on probation or continue the offender’s probation and require as a 
condition of the probation that the offender successfully complete an appropriate supervised 
alternative living program having a mental health treatment component.”). 
 167. Either party may file a motion, within ten days of conviction and before sentencing, “if 
the motion is supported by substantial information indicating that the defendant may presently be 
suffering from a mental disease or defect for the treatment of which he is in need of custody for 
care or treatment in a suitable facility.” 18 U.S.C. § 4244(a). 
 168. Id.  Before the hearing, the court may order a psychiatric examination of the defendant 
and the filing of a psychiatric report with the court, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 4247(b) 
and (c). Id. § 4244(b). 
 169. See United States v. Chapman, 902 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting 18. U.S.C. § 4244). 
 170. 18 U.S.C. § 4244(d). 
 171. Id.  
 172. See id.; see also United States v. Wood, 459 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459–60 (E.D. Va. 2006) 
(noting that the recommended sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines would be “around one 
quarter of the time [the defendant] would receive under section 4244(d)”); United States v. Moses, 
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recovers from his mental disorder to the extent that his continued custody in a 
mental health facility is unnecessary, but he has not yet served the full length of 
his provisional sentence, the court will proceed to traditional sentencing.173 
A defendant’s need for treatment, ability to cope within a typical correctional 
environment, and susceptibility to harm in prison are all appropriate factors for 
a court’s consideration under § 4244.  The Fifth Circuit has opined that § 4244 
advances several legitimate governmental interests: “(1) protecting mentally ill 
prisoners who might be at substantial risk if placed in the general prison 
population; (2) ensuring the safety of other inmates; and (3) providing 
humanitarian treatment for mentally ill inmates.”174  Other courts have cited 
these purposes as animating the statute.175  Accordingly, one forensic 
psychology text reflects that “[t]he main issue in [Section 4244] evaluations is 
not only the severity of the mental illness from which the defendant suffers, but 
also how well the mentally ill defendant can adapt to prison society at a standard 
federal prison facility.  In essence, it is a question of the fit between the mentally 
ill defendant’s needs, the prison’s treatment abilities, and the prisoner’s 
perceived coping abilities.”176 
The statute anticipates that commitment will only be necessary for a fraction 
of offenders with mental disorders.177  For example, a pre-hearing psychiatric or 
psychological report may conclude that a particular defendant suffers from a 
mental disease or defect “but that it is not such as to require his custody for care 
or treatment in a suitable facility.”178  In these cases, the report must include the 
expert’s opinion regarding the sentencing alternatives available to the court.179  
If the court finds that a disordered offender does not require commitment outside 
                                                 
106 F.3d 1273, 1275 n.1 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Roberts, 915 F.2d 889, 892 (4th Cir. 
1990). 
 173. 18 U.S.C. § 4244(e). The defendant will receive credit for time served under his 
provisional sentence.  See United States v. Abou-Kassem, 78 F.3d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1996); 
Roberts, 915 F.2d at 892.  He will be released “upon expiration of the maximum term that could 
have been imposed for the offense of conviction.”  See 7A FED. PROC. FORMS § 20:981 (Lawyer’s 
Ed., 2012). 
 174. Abou-Kassem, 78 F.3d at 165. 
 175. See, e.g., United States v. Jensen, 639 F.3d 802, 805–06 (8th Cir. 2011); Moses, 106 F.3d 
at 1277 n.2; cf. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 245 (1984) (adding the provision “in order to assist the court 
in determining the proper facility for commitment of a convicted defendant,” to “benefit . . . a 
convicted defendant who is mentally ill and who needs hospitalization,” to “protect[] the public 
from mentally ill convicted defendants,” and to “treat[] and hopefully cur[e] such a person”). 
 176. Daniel A. Krauss & Alan M. Goldstein, The Role of Forensic Mental Health Experts in 
Federal Sentencing Proceedings, in FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 359, 377–78 (Alan M. Goldstein ed., 
2007). 
 177. See United States v. Buker, 902 F.2d 769, 770 (9th Cir. 1990) (reasoning that Congress 
did not intend for every mentally ill defendant, without regard to the severity of their illnesses, to 
be committed under § 4244). 
 178. 18 U.S.C. § 4244(b) (2006). 
 179. Id. 
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the prison system, the sentencing judge may recommend the offender’s 
placement in a correctional facility capable of providing for his mental health 
needs, such as a federal medical facility.180  However, these recommendations 
are not binding on correctional authorities,181 and therefore do not ensure that a 
vulnerable, disordered prisoner will be housed in a facility with adequate 
treatment or protective resources. 
Although this type of statute permits judges to commit some disordered 
offenders for treatment when confinement in a typical carceral environment 
would be intolerably injurious, these statutes are insufficient to protect mentally 
ill prisoners.  First, they may expose defendants to longer terms of confinement 
than would have been probable under sentencing guidelines.182  Second, some 
state statutes include a requirement that placement in a mental health institution 
must be consistent with public safety, or restrict the application of the statute to 
low-level offenders.183  Most importantly, none of these statutes reaches 
offenders who could function in a correctional environment with reasonable 
accommodations.  For these offenders, judges can only recommend correctional 
placements, which correctional authorities are free to ignore.184 
B.  Vulnerability as a Mitigating Factor 
A greater number of states designate an offender’s susceptibility to harm in 
prison or need for treatment as a mitigating factor at sentencing.185  At least a 
dozen jurisdictions recognize excessive offender hardship as a mitigating 
factor.186  Many state statutes frame the sentencing factor in general, source-
neutral terms.  Arkansas, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Montana, New Jersey, 
North Dakota, and Utah, for instance, authorize judges to consider when 
imprisonment would result in “undue” or “excessive” hardship for an 
                                                 
 180. See, e.g.,  Buker, 902 F.2d at 769–70; United States v. Chapman, 902 F.2d 1331, 1333–
34 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gigante, 989 F. Supp. 436, 438, 443 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Krauss 
& Goldstein, supra note 176, at 377. 
 181. See infra note 304 and accompanying text (discussing the frequency with which Federal 
Bureau of Prisons officials adopt judicial recommendations). 
 182. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 183. See HAW. REV. STAT. Ann. § 706-607 (LexisNexis 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN.  
§§ 22-3429 to -3430 (2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.1055 (West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.  
§ 12.1-32-02(1)(g) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 184. See infra note 304 and accompanying text. 
 185. See supra note 13 (stressing that explicit authorization is most critical in jurisdictions with 
determinate sentencing regimes). 
 186. See infra notes 187–89, 199.  In addition, states may have a “catch-all” provision, which 
allows courts to mitigate an individual’s sentence when it feels that doing so is necessary for the 
ends of justice.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(E)(6) (2012) (providing that the court 
shall consider “[a]ny other factor that is relevant to the defendant’s character or background or to 
the nature or circumstances of the crime and that the court finds to be mitigating”). 
2014] Conditions of Confinement at Sentencing 653 
offender.187  Other states specify that mitigation may be appropriate when the 
likely hardship stems from a specific source.  One example is Illinois, which 
instructs a sentencing judge to consider, as a factor in favor of withholding or 
minimizing a sentence of imprisonment, whether “the imprisonment of the 
defendant would endanger his or her medical condition.”188  The District of 
Columbia, on the other hand, allows a judge to sentence outside the voluntary 
sentencing guidelines if she “determines that the defendant, by reason of obvious 
and substantial mental or physical impairment or infirmity, cannot be adequately 
protected or treated in any available prison facility.”189 
In addition, at least a dozen jurisdictions classify an offender’s need for 
treatment as a valid consideration at sentencing.  Some statutory provisions 
simply express concern for a defendant’s need for, and amenability to, 
                                                 
 187. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-301(c)(11) (2012) (authorizing the trial court to consider, in 
favor of suspension or probation for most criminal offenses, whether “[t]he imprisonment of the 
defendant would entail excessive hardship to the defendant or to a dependent of the defendant”); 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-621(2)(i) (LexisNexis 2007) (“The court, in determining whether to 
impose a term of probation, shall consider [whether] . . . [t]he imprisonment of the defendant would 
entail excessive hardship to the defendant or the defendant’s dependents[.]”); IND. CODE ANN.  
35-38-1-7.1(b)(10) (LexisNexis 2012) (“The court may consider the following factors as mitigating 
circumstances or as favoring suspending the sentence and imposing probation: . . . Imprisonment 
of the person will result in undue hardship to the person or the dependents of the person.”); LA. 
CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 894.1.B(31) (2013) (providing that courts, when deciding whether 
to suspend a sentence and impose probation, should consider whether “[t]he imprisonment of the 
defendant would entail excessive hardship to himself or his dependents”); MONT. CODE ANN.  
§ 46-18-225(2)(j) (West 2011) (“Prior to sentencing a nonviolent felony offender . . . to a term of 
imprisonment in a state prison, the sentencing judge shall take into account  
whether: . . . imprisonment of the offender would create an excessive hardship on the offender or 
the offender’s family.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(b)(11) (West 2013) (listing, as a criterion for 
the appropriateness of imprisonment as a sanction, whether “imprisonment of the defendant would 
entail excessive hardship to himself or his dependents”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-04(11) (2012) 
(suggesting that the trial court should consider, in deciding whether to order imprisonment, whether 
“[t]he imprisonment of the defendant would entail undue hardship to himself or his dependents”); 
UTAH SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 ADULT SENTENCING AND RELEASE GUIDELINES, at 12–13, 
available at http://www.sentencing.utah.gov/Guidelines/Adult/2011%20Adult%20Sentencing 
%20and%20Release%20Guidelines.pdf (specifying that “[i]mprisonment [that] would entail 
excessive hardship on offender or dependents” constitutes a mitigating factor that may “compel 
deviation from the guidelines”); see also 9 MINN. PRAC., CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE § 36:41(F) 
(4th ed. 2013) (explaining that, under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines as interpreted through 
case law, a judge must consider a dispositional departure at sentencing if the defendant is vulnerable 
to victimization in a prison setting).  See generally Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at 
Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1069, 1119–20 & n.284 (2009) (characterizing the hardship of 
imprisonment as a mitigating factor that has been considered “particularly powerful in various 
jurisdictions”). 
 188. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-5-3.1(a)(12) (West 2013). 
 189. D.C. SENTENCING & CRIM. CODE REVISION COMM’N, VOLUNTARY 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5.2.3(8) (2012). 
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specialized treatment.190  Other statutes permit the judge to assess implications 
for public safety and a treatment program’s likelihood of reducing offender 
recidivism.191  Still other statutes direct judges to determine whether a defendant 
has a greater need for treatment than carceral punishment.192 
                                                 
 190. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (“The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth . . . . The court, in determining the 
particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider . . . the need for the sentence imposed . . .  to 
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other 
correctional treatment in the most effective manner . . . .”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0026(2)(d) 
(West 2012) (treating as a mitigating circumstance when “[t]he defendant requires specialized 
treatment for a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance abuse or addiction or for a physical 
disability, and the defendant is amenable to treatment”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-606(2)(d) 
(LexisNexis 2012) (requiring the court to consider, when imposing a sentence, the need “[t]o 
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other 
correctional treatment in the most effective manner”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.16 (West 
2013) (permitting the court discretion to depart from the presumptive sentence range where a 
defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of the mitigating factor that 
“[t]he defendant has a good treatment prognosis, and a workable treatment plan is available”); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-04(10) (2012) (providing that, “while not controlling the discretion of the 
court” in its decision whether to order imprisonment, it “shall be accorded weight” whether “[t]he 
defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment”); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:44-1(b)(10) (West 2013) (allowing the court, in discerning whether a sentence of 
imprisonment is appropriate, to consider the mitigating circumstance of whether “[t]he defendant 
is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 7030(a) (2012) (directing the court to consider the defendant’s need for treatment and his “risk to 
self” in determining his sentence); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.017(2) (West 2012) (“When a court 
makes a sentencing decision concerning a person convicted of a criminal offense . . . , the court 
shall consider . . . [t]he rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”); D.C. SENTENCING & CRIM. CODE 
REVISION COMM’N, VOLUNTARY SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5.2.3(8) (2013) 
(permitting a trial judge to depart from the voluntary sentencing guidelines upon a finding of the 
mitigating factor that “the defendant, by reason of obvious and substantial mental or physical 
impairment or infirmity, cannot be adequately . . . treated in any available prison facility”); see also 
State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (“[A] defendant’s particular amenability to 
individualized treatment in a probationary setting will justify departure in the form of a stay of 
execution of a presumptively executed sentence.”); infra note 199 (noting possible departures under 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines). 
 191. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2523(1) (2012) (“In determining the sentence to be imposed 
. . . , if the defendant’s mental condition is a significant factor, the court shall consider such factors 
as: (a) The extent to which the defendant is mentally ill; (b) The degree of illness or defect and 
level of functional impairment; (c) The prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation; (d) The 
availability of treatment and level of care required; (e) Any risk of danger which the defendant may 
create for the public, if at large, or the absence of such risk. . . .”); OR. ADMIN.  
R. 213-008-0002(1)(a)(I) (2013) (listing, as a mitigating factor that may be considered in 
determining whether substantial and compelling reasons for a departure exist, whether “[t]he 
offender is amenable to treatment and an appropriate treatment program is available to which the 
offender can be admitted within a reasonable period of time; the treatment program is likely to be 
more effective than the presumptive prison term in reducing the risk of offender recidivism; and 
the probation sentence will serve community safety interests by promoting offender reformation”). 
 192. See DEL. SENTENCING ACCOUNTABILITY COMM’N, BENCHBOOK 2013, at 1, 123,  
126–27 (2013), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/Superior/pdf/benchbook_2013.pdf 
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Currently, a judge’s assessment of an offender’s need for treatment and likely 
hardship in prison may affect his sentence in one of two ways.193  First, offender 
vulnerability may militate towards a suspended sentence of incarceration with 
probation.194  For example, the New Jersey statute authorizes judges to consider, 
among other mitigating factors, whether “imprisonment of the defendant would 
entail excessive hardship to himself” and whether “[t]he defendant is particularly 
likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment.”195  Case law suggests 
that the mitigating factors typically result in probation only for those offenders 
who have limited aggravating factors, have no prior criminal history, or would 
otherwise be amenable to probation.196  In states that limit the use of these 
mitigating factors to the probation/incarceration calculus, courts lack the means 
to mitigate the vulnerability of prisoners who fall outside this narrow band.197 
                                                 
(authorizing the court to depart from the prescribed sentence range when mitigating factor(s) are 
found, including whether “the offender is in greater need of an available treatment program than of 
punishment through incarceration,” and whether, “before detection, the defendant . . . voluntarily 
sought professional help for drug/alcohol treatment, or for any other recognized compulsive 
behavioral disorders related to the offense”). 
 193. In addition, some states permit courts to commit offenders for treatment in lieu of 
incarceration.  See supra Part III.A. 
 194. See supra notes 187–92 (citing state statutes that permit the judge to consider the hardship 
an offender may experience in prison or his need for treatment). 
 195. N.J. STAT. ANN § 2C:44-1(b)(10)–(11) (West 2013). 
 196. See, e.g., State v. Evers, 815 A.2d 432, 451–55 (N.J. 2003) (representing that it is only an 
“extraordinary or extremely unusual case where the human cost of imprisoning a defendant for the 
sake of deterrence constitutes a serious injustice” and reviewing relevant case law); State v. Jarbath, 
555 A.2d 559, 561, 569 (N.J. 1989) (finding that the extreme hardship of an offender with mental 
retardation, who had suffered almost daily severe abuse in prison and had attempted suicide, and 
her likelihood of responding to conditional probationary treatment outweighed the deterrent value 
of her carceral sentence, where no aggravating factors applied and the defendant was unlikely to 
commit future violent acts); State v. E.R., 641 A.2d 1072, 1073, 1077–78 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1994) (approving a probationary sentence upon resentencing for an offender who was 
amenable to probation, would suffer extreme hardship in prison, was not at risk of committing 
another offense, and was likely to die within a few months from AIDS); see also State v. Wright, 
310 N.W.2d 461, 462–63 (Minn. 1981) (upholding the dispositional departure where the defendant 
was “more child than man” and would be victimized easily in prison, no appropriate psychiatric 
institution was available, the defendant was amenable to individualized treatment in a probationary 
setting, and he would pose a minimal threat to society if supervised through out-patient treatment); 
State v. Hitz, No. C6-90-1168, 1990 WL 115108, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 1990) (affirming 
a dispositional departure based on reports that a mentally disordered defendant would become 
suicidal in prison and that he was more amenable to probation and treatment than prison); Rachel 
Konforty, Efforts to Control Judicial Discretion: The Problem of AIDS and Sentencing, 1998 ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 49, 64–65, 92-94 (1998) (describing New Jersey’s statutory framework and its 
application within the context of AIDS and HIV). 
 197. See, e.g., State v. Behl, 573 N.W.2d  711, 713-14 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that 
offender-related factors, such as post-offense conduct and new psychological evidence, may justify 
a dispositional departure but not a durational departure, while offense-related factors can support 
both dispositional and durational departures). 
656 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 63:625 
Other jurisdictions, including the federal government,198 allow courts to 
shorten the prison terms of offenders likely to suffer extreme hardship while 
incarcerated.199  These jurisdictions, in effect, allow a sentencing “discount” for 
the increased severity of a vulnerable offender’s carceral sentence, as compared 
to the anticipated prison experience of a standard offender.200  However, judges 
in these jurisdictions cannot tailor the conditions of confinement in order to 
reduce a vulnerable offender’s risk of harm.  This predicament has led to 
charges, such as those raised by Professor Mary Sigler, that reducing an 
offender’s prison term on the basis of extreme vulnerability to victimization is 
functionally equivalent to sentencing him to a prison term “at rape” or to a term 
involving another form of cruelty.201 
Although these statutes are preferable to sentencing systems that discourage 
judges from modifying presumptive carceral sentences due to their likely 
injurious effect, they do not go far enough.  Intermediate sanctions such as 
weekends in jail and laborious community service may provide appropriate (and 
cost-effective) penalties for many offenders.202  However, imprisonment will 
likely remain a necessary sanction for the most serious offenses.203  While some 
                                                 
 198. See Mary Sigler, Just Deserts, Prison Rape, and the Pleasing Fiction of Guideline 
Sentencing, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 561, 571–74 (2006).  Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, mental 
and emotional conditions are ordinarily irrelevant to the judge’s determination of whether a 
sentence should fall outside of the suggested range established by the Guidelines for a criminal 
offense.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.3 (2010).  However, under Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines section 5H1.3, an offender’s vulnerability due to mental or emotional 
conditions may justify a downward departure so long as such conditions “are present to an unusual 
degree and distinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.”  Id.  Some courts 
have also relied on sections 5K2.0, 5H1.4, and 5K2.13 to grant downward departures on the basis 
of suspected or demonstrated hardship in prison.  See Johnston, supra note 2, at 181–82 & nn. 
172–75. 
 199. See, e.g., Kern v. State, No. 47A01–0706–CR–277, 2008 WL 1746704, at *2 (Ind. Ct. 
App. Apr. 17, 2008) (holding that the trial court afforded sufficient weight to defendant’s back pain 
and pleurisy as a mitigating factor when it sentenced her to less than the maximum sentence of 
incarceration); Moyer v. State, 796 N.E.2d 309, 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion in failing to consider the defendant’s history of lymphoma, 
malignancy of the larynx, recurring tumors, pulmonary disease, reliance on a breathing apparatus, 
and need for frequent tracheal cleanings and sterile catheters and, consequently, reducing the 
defendant’s sentence from forty years in prison to twenty-four years). 
 200. See Johnston, Vulnerability, supra note 2, at 201–03. 
 201. Sigler, supra note 198, at 573. 
 202. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 127–28 (1996); Robert E. Harlow et al., 
The Severity of Intermediate Penal Sanctions: A Psychophysical Scaling Approach for Obtaining 
Community Perceptions, 11 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 71, 72 (1995); Paul H. Robinson  
& John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst 
When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO L.J. 949, 996 (2003); supra note 163. 
 203. Some commentators have opined that incarceration is the only sanction severe enough to 
communicate the degree of censure warranted for commission of serious offenses.  See, e.g., VON 
HIRSCH, supra note 136, at 111; Harlow et al., supra note 202, at 86.  In addition, incarceration 
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statutes allow a sentencing court to recognize the likely harshness of a vulnerable 
offender’s sentence by shortening his term of imprisonment, none grants courts 
the authority to ensure that a prison sentence will be carried out under conditions 
that are humane and that approximate, as closely as possible, the conditions that 
a non-vulnerable person would experience if confined.204  Indeed, the shortened 
terms appear to condone the harsher treatment experienced by the vulnerable 
inmate. 
In jurisdictions that permit judges to weigh vulnerability as a mitigating factor 
at sentencing, judges may consider the offender’s need for treatment or the 
potential hardships he may face in prison.  While existing statutory schemes do 
not permit judges to dictate conditions of incarceration, these approaches 
demonstrate the legislative judgment that offender vulnerability is a valid and 
important sentencing factor.  They also establish legislatures’ confidence in 
judges’ abilities to accurately and fairly evaluate a defendant’s current mental 
health status, future treatment needs, ability to cope within a traditional 
correctional environment, and likelihood of experiencing excessive or undue 
harm if incarcerated.205 
That legislatures entrust judges with these important tasks should not be 
surprising, because fact-finding and individualized risk assessment are routine 
                                                 
may be the only sanction likely to serve as an effective general or specific deterrent in specific 
instances.  See DAVID C. ANDERSON, SENSIBLE JUSTICE 144 (1998). 
 204. See Bonnie P. Tucker, Deaf Prison Inmates: Time to Be Heard, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 
14 (1988) (arguing that the solution to the problem of harsher prison experiences of deaf prisoners 
“lies in equalizing—to the extent practicable—the conditions of confinement for deaf and hearing 
prisoners”). 
 205. See Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 452 F.3d 235, 245–49 (3d Cir. 2005) (observing 
that Congress demonstrated its confidence in sentencing judges by requiring the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons to consider any court statements regarding the reasoning behind a sentencing 
recommendation).  This legislative confidence, and judges’ history of sentencing under these 
statutes, may offer a partial response to commentators such as Judge Marvin Frankel, who have 
questioned judges’ abilities to individualize sentences.  See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL 
SENTENCES 12–25 (1972); Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1,  
4–8 (1972).  Frankel criticized judges’ broad sentencing discretion within indeterminate sentencing 
schemes, which he characterized as a state of “lawlessness” that afforded the opportunity to express 
personal bias and prejudice.  See Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, supra, at 6–9.  Those concerns 
would have less purchase in the context of the reforms suggested by this Article, which would 
permit the consideration of offender vulnerability as a sentencing factor, see infra Part IV.A., and 
would allow for explicit, reasoned sentencing decisions susceptible to review.  But see Michael M. 
O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentences: Reconsidering Deference, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2123, 
2135–52 (2010) (identifying reasons as to why trial courts may be less inclined to make high 
quality, fine-grained sentencing decisions than is often assumed and thus why their decisions may 
be less worthy of deference).  The fact that the Bureau of Prisons follows most judicial 
recommendations suggests the reasonableness and feasibility of judicial suggestions for placement, 
programming, and treatment.  See infra notes 304–306 and accompanying text. 
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aspects of judging.206  Crimes typically include a mens rea component, for 
instance, and sentencing often involves an assessment of an offender’s 
likelihood of recidivism.  Judges weigh analogous considerations and engage in 
similar fact-finding pursuits when they consider information gathered by 
probation staff in presentence reports, adjudicate civil commitment hearings, 
quantify future loss, and decide custody cases.207  Moreover, by the time a 
mentally disordered offender appears for sentencing, the judge is likely familiar 
with his mental health history and status and is therefore in a good position to 
structure the sentence to meet his particular needs.208  While correctional 
officials will also assess an offender’s mental health and susceptibility to 
harm,209 the assessment of a sentencing judge may enjoy a higher likelihood of 
accuracy, given a defendant’s rights at sentencing to an attorney’s assistance in 
gathering evidence of mental disorder and vulnerability (including medical 
records and, potentially, expert opinions), in bringing this information to the 
judge’s attention, and in arguing that it warrants mitigation (if supported by 
law).210 
IV.  EXTENSION OF JUDGES’ CONSIDERATION OF VULNERABILITY TO 
CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT 
Legislatures typically permit judges to specify conditions of probation but 
limit judges to establishing the duration of terms of confinement.  A number of 
compelling reasons support withholding judicial authority from conditions of 
                                                 
 206. See, e.g., CYNTHIA A. MAMALIAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF 
PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT 6, 9 (2011), available at http://www.pretrial.org/download 
/risk-assessment/PJI%20State%20of%20the%20Science%20Pretrial%20Risk%20Assessment 
%20(2011).pdf; Jonathan Simon, Reversal of Fortune: The Resurgence of Individual Risk 
Assessment in Criminal Justice, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397, 398 (2005). 
 207. See, e.g., Kolber, supra note 18, at 1165–66 (discussing various institutional actors’ 
experiences of measuring the actual or anticipated experiences of offenders and victims).  But see 
O’Hear, supra note 205, at 2137–40 (arguing that an accumulation of experience does not 
necessarily warrant an assumption of competence). 
 208. Judges have the opportunity to consider and receive information concerning a defendant’s 
mental illness at multiple stages in the criminal justice process, including bail determinations, 
competency proceedings, and defense to criminal charges.  Additionally, many state statutes require 
probation officers to include an offender’s mental health history in the presentencing report, and 
others permit the inclusion of this information if relevant to the appropriateness of sentencing 
options.  Johnston, supra note 2, at 159.  Judges likely have less information about defendants who 
plead guilty than those who go to trial.  However, sentencing judges still have the benefit of 
presentence reports for defendants who plead guilty.  See Gabriel J. Chin, Taking Plea Bargaining 
Seriously: Reforming Pre-Sentence Reports After Padilla v. Kentucky, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 61, 63 & n.13 (2011). 
 209. See supra Part I. 
 210. See Hessick, supra note 187, at 1101–02 (listing defendants’ rights at sentencing); Alan 
C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1787–88 (2003) (exploring which 
constitutional trial rights apply at sentencing). 
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confinement.  As the U.S. Supreme Court stressed in Turner v. Safley, “[r]unning 
a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, 
and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province 
of the legislative and executive branches of government.”211  Correctional 
officials, not judges, have the best sense of available resources, know which 
offenders are most in need of these resources, and are best able to track 
offenders’ evolving treatment needs.  Moreover, judges’ micromanagement of 
prison affairs can adversely affect prison security.212 
These objections apply, to a varied extent, to all of the reforms proposed 
below.  However, there are several advantages to the judicial tailoring of 
conditions of confinement for vulnerable offenders.  First, specific conditions of 
confinement may be integral to a judge’s sentencing goals and to the 
humaneness of the sentence.213  Legislatures should authorize judges to order 
any condition integral to the purpose or legitimacy of a sentence so that they 
may fulfill their institutional roles as arbiters of proportional and appropriate 
punishment.  Second, the pretrial, adjudication, and sentencing processes will 
often yield relevant information about offenders’ mental health histories and 
needs.214  Allowing this information to factor into placement, programming, and 
treatment decisions could result in more appropriate and efficient inmate 
designations. 
                                                 
 211. 482 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1987); see also Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 
119, 126 (1977) (“Because the realities of running a penal institution are complex and difficult, we 
have . . . recognized the wide-ranging deference to be accorded the decisions of prison 
administrators.”); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (observing that overcoming 
the “Herculean obstacles” to effectively maintaining order and discipline, preventing unauthorized 
access or escape, and rehabilitating prisoners “require[s] expertise, comprehensive planning, and 
the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and 
executive branches of government”) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 85). 
 212. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“Prison officials must be free to take 
appropriate action to ensure the safety of inmates and corrections personnel and to prevent escape 
or unauthorized entry” and therefore should be afforded “wide-ranging deference in the adoption 
and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order 
and discipline and to maintain institutional security”); Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (“Subjecting the day-
to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper 
their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable 
problems of prison administration.”). 
 213. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Criminal Justice System, Project on Standards Relating to the Legal 
Status of Prisoners, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 377, 408–09 (1977) (advocating that, as a means to 
ensure that prisoners’ sentences are carried out consistently with the purposes and intents of their 
sentences, “[j]udges should not sentence defendants to confinement unless correctional authorities 
have certified in writing that facilities, programs, and personnel are available to reasonably carry 
out the purpose and intent of each sentence,” and “[s]entencing courts should be authorized . . . to 
reduce a sentence or modify its terms whenever the court finds after an open hearing that the 
treatment of the prisoner or the conditions under which he lives are not related to the purpose of 
the sentence.”). 
 214. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 158–59. 
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Third, judicial input could help to counter the tendency of correctional 
officials to prioritize the mental health treatment of prisoners who pose security 
threats.  Prisons arguably operate under a conflict of interest: they have a moral 
and legal obligation to detect and treat inmates’ serious mental disorders, but 
under-detecting and under-treating mental illness may conserve valuable 
financial, medical, staff, and therapeutic housing resources, at least in the short 
term.  Indeed, commentators have long complained that correctional officials 
tend to overlook the mental disorders of offenders who slip through the mental 
health screening process at intake and who do not pose a security threat.215 
Fourth, few checks exist to ensure that prison conditions are humane and 
appropriate.  Prisoners have limited tools with which to demand better 
conditions,216 and judges have limited power to alter conditions of confinement 
after sentencing.217  Fifth, the public nature of the sentencing proceeding would 
impart a degree of transparency and accountability to the assessment and 
treatment of seriously disordered prisoners.218  Currently, prisons conduct 
mental health and vulnerability assessments behind closed doors, so decisions 
regarding assessment, treatment, and housing receive little scrutiny.219  
Permitting judges to consider an individual’s mental disorder, treatment needs, 
and susceptibility to harm at sentencing would bring these assessments and 
underlying prison conditions to light and would subject them to public review 
and debate. 
Finally, encouraging judges to consult and collaborate with correctional 
officials in the reaching and imposing of conditions would help to protect 
important correctional interests.  Generally, judges should seek input from 
affected correctional agencies before ordering any condition that implicates 
correctional affairs.220  In addition, though alternative models of judicial 
                                                 
 215. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 216. See, e.g., Simmat v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 413 F.3d 1225, 1231–40 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(detailing hurdles to inmates’ challenges of federal prison conditions under a variety of theories); 
ELLIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 69–70 (discussing the administrative remedy process within the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons); Russell, supra note 2, at 808–17 (assessing means of state and federal 
offenders to secure adequate care in prison or release from confinement). 
 217. For thoughtful elucidations of Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims and 
available remedies, see Alice Ristroph, State Intentions and the Law of Punishment, 98 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1353, 1380–84 (2008); Reinert, supra note 138, at 1595–1602. 
 218. See Kay A. Knapp, Allocation of Discretion and Accountability Within Sentencing 
Structures, 64 U. COLO L. REV. 679, 689 (1993) (“[T]he judiciary is the discretionary point that is 
most accountable. Compared to any other discretionary point—prosecutors, corrections 
administrators, or parole boards—judicial decisions are public, as is the information on which they 
base their decisions (open at least to those involved with the case, if not to the public at large).  
Judges are expected to provide reasons for their decisions and there is a strong tradition of review 
for most decisions—although not for sentencing decisions.”). 
 219. See supra Part I (discussing aspects of mental health screens, treatment, and housing 
decisions in prison). 
 220. See supra note 213; infra note 254. 
2014] Conditions of Confinement at Sentencing 661 
authority are possible,221 allowing the government to move to reopen a sentence 
if it believes that an ordered condition is inappropriate, unreasonable, or 
infeasible would allow for judicial reconsideration of those conditions that create 
security risks, are unnecessary in light of an offender’s evolving mental health 
needs, or are impracticable due to resource constraints. 
A.  Permissive or Mandatory Sentencing Factor 
Legislatures seeking to give greater sentencing discretion to judges must 
determine whether the consideration of mentally disordered offenders’ 
vulnerability should be mandatory or permissive.  A legislature could dictate that 
judges must consider certain offenders’ vulnerability and take necessary actions 
to ensure humane, proportionate, and appropriate punishment.  Alternatively, a 
legislature could authorize judges to consider offender vulnerability and take 
necessary actions to prevent foreseeable and substantial harm. 
The statutory approaches detailed in Part III reflect varying legislative 
judgments on this issue.  Statutes authorizing judges to commit defendants for 
treatment in lieu of incarceration differ both in the extent to which judges must 
consider a defendant’s need for treatment and the level of discretion afforded to 
judges in choosing whether to commit the offender.222  Similarly, states that 
classify vulnerability as a mitigating factor may or may not require judges to 
consider vulnerability at sentencing.  Some states require courts to consider the 
likelihood that an offender will experience undue hardship if incarcerated,223 
                                                 
 221. At least two other models are possible for how judges could respond to a finding of 
offender vulnerability.  First, a judge could order a correctional agency to take some mandatory 
action, such as disqualifying a particular facility as a possible housing option.  At the other end of 
the spectrum, a judge could identify an offender as having a serious mental disorder and likely 
vulnerable to harm, and simply order the correctional agency to report back to the judge after intake 
with its classification and housing plan for the offender.  At this point, the court would have the 
option of resentencing the offender if his punishment, in light of the department’s housing and 
treatment plan, appears disproportionate, excessive, or otherwise inappropriate.  While the first 
option would allow for too little input from correctional officials, the latter would provide judges 
too little control over those conditions that they feel are necessary, over the length of a prisoner’s 
term, for the effectuation of the purposes of punishment or to ensure the humaneness of an 
offender’s sentence. 
 222. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4244(a), (d) (2006), and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27-45 (2004) 
(directing the court to consider a defendant’s mental health status and need for commitment and 
mandating commitment if he meets certain criteria), with HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-607 
(LexisNexis 2007); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-26(c) (West 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN.  
§§ 22-3429, 22-3430 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-02(1)(g) (West 2012); and 50 PA. 
STAT. ANN. § 4410(a), (c) (West 2001) (granting discretion to the judge to determine whether to 
order a mental examination or hearing and whether to commit the offender). 
 223. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-301(c)(11) (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.  
§ 706-621(2)(i); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-5-3.1(a)(12); LA. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
894.1.B(31) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-225(j) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32 
-04(11). 
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while others treat susceptibility to harm as a permissive sentencing factor.224  
Likewise, some states require courts to consider a mentally disordered 
offender’s treatment needs at sentencing,225 while others merely permit courts to 
do so.226 
Vulnerability should at least be a permissive factor at sentencing, and 
legislatures that already permit sentencing judges to accommodate vulnerability 
should consider extending that authority to conditions of carceral confinement.  
While strong arguments support designating offender vulnerability as an 
obligatory factor, counterveiling considerations exist.  The decision to classify 
vulnerability as a permissive or a mandatory sentencing consideration holds 
important systemic ramifications. 
A number of negative consequences could flow from assigning vulnerability 
as a discretionary factor.  Permitting judges to disregard vulnerability ensures 
disparity in treatment.  Some judges will be more interested in recognizing 
vulnerability in sentencing than others, and such discretion will allow the 
expression of bias or favoritism or otherwise exacerbate discriminatory 
tendencies.227  These are not new problems: uneven administration has always 
been a hallmark of probation with conditions, and disparate treatment is a feature 
of indeterminate sentencing systems and jurisdictions with voluntary sentencing 
guidelines.228  Relatedly, designating vulnerability as a discretionary factor 
                                                 
 224. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. 35-38-1-7.1(b)(10) (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN.  
§ 2C:44-1(b)(11) (West 2013); D.C. SENTENCING & CRIM. CODE REVISION COMM’N, 
VOLUNTARY SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §5.2.3(8) (2013); UTAH SENTENCING COMM’N, 
2011 ADULT SENTENCING AND RELEASE GUIDELINES, at 15, available at 
http://www.sentencing.utah.gov/Guidelines/Adult/2011%20Adult%20Sentencing%20and%20Rel
ease%20Guidelines.pdf. 
 225. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-606(2)(d); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 19-2523; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-04(12); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7030 
(2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.017(2) (West 2007). 
 226. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0026(2)(d) (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN.  
§ 2C:44-1(b)(10) (West 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.16 (West 2011); OR. ADMIN. 
R. 213-008-0002(1)(a)(I) (2013); DEL. SENTENCING ACCOUNTABILITY COMM’N, supra note 193, 
at 123, 127; DIST. OF COLUMBIA SENTENCING & CRIM. CODE REVISION COMM’N, VOLUNTARY 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §5.2.3(8) (2013). 
 227. See NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION 207 
(1990) (observing that some judges reserve alternative sentencing options for white, middle- or 
upper-class offenders).  Thus, the exercise of discretion may exacerbate the unfortunate and 
intolerable gap in addressing the mental health needs of whites versus those of African Americans.  
See Jennifer M. Keys, When They Need Us Most: The Unaddressed Crisis of Mentally Ill African 
American Children in the Juvenile Justice System, 2 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 289, 301–10 (2009) 
(discussing racial disparities in recognizing and treating the mental illnesses of juveniles). 
 228. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 205, at 21–23; ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 
23–30 (reprint ed. 1986); Gary L. Mason, Indeterminate Sentencing: Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment, or Just Plain Cruel?, 16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 89, 100, 120 
n.69 (1990); Dean J. Spader, Megatrends in Criminal Justice Theory, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 157, 189 
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contributes to the uncertainty and opacity of the sentencing process because an 
offender will seldom know before sentencing whether the judge will consider 
his mental health needs and susceptibility to harm.  This type of inconsistency 
and lack of transparency currently exist in the federal system as a consequence 
of United States v. Booker.229 
Conversely, mandating the consideration of disordered offenders’ 
vulnerability carries both substantial benefits and significant disadvantages.230  
In some instances, judges may have more and better information than 
correctional officials, and thus may identify some disordered and vulnerable 
offenders whom correctional officials may miss.231  Over time, judicial decisions 
concerning vulnerability would become more predictable and transparent.  
Moreover, treating vulnerability as a mandatory sentencing factor could prompt 
legislatures to develop regulatory regimes and allocate resources to aid judges 
in the accuracy of their determinations.  Upstream and downstream actors would 
become attentive to the mental health of offenders as a matter of law.232  For 
example, law enforcement would be more likely to note the mental status of a 
suspect and to perform some sort of mental health assessment at intake.  
Prosecutors would consider the mental health of a defendant and affirmatively 
differentiate between prison environments when considering sentencing options.  
Defense counsel would also investigate the defendant’s mental health and 
vulnerability under various sentencing options,233 and the failure to recognize an 
                                                 
(1986) (“Whenever discretion exists, especially in the difficult and value-laden tasks of sentencing, 
vast disparities exist between sentencing decisionmakers.”). 
 229. 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that mandatory sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional 
and, therefore, granting judges greater discretion in sentencing); see Kolber, supra note 2, at  
194–95; cf. Raeder, supra note 18, at 741–43 (urging judges to use their discretion under Booker 
to consider correctional conditions in sentencing). 
 230. The observations of, and conversations with, Professors Miriam Baer, Douglas Berman, 
Jerold Israel, and Scott Sundby enriched this section. 
 231. See supra notes 208–10 and accompanying text. 
 232. Training and education would be useful to facilitate the consideration of mental disorder 
by actors in criminal justice system.  See, e.g., JACKIE MASSARO, GAINS TECHNICAL ASSIST. & 
POLICY ANALYSIS CTR. FOR JAIL DIVERSION, OVERVIEW OF THE MENTAL HEALTH SERVICE 
SYSTEM FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS 4 (2005), available at http://gains 
center.samhsa.gov/pdfs/jail_diversion/MassaroII.pdf (describing the training of police and 
correctional officers to identify and respond appropriately to mental health problems); Mental 
Health on the Bench: Empowering Judges to Change the Way the Criminal Justice System 
Responds to Mental Illness and Substance Abuse, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS, 
http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=CIT&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDispl
ay.cfm&ContentID=148027 (last visited May 15, 2014) (describing training programs on mental 
disorders for judges, attorneys, and court personnel).  I am grateful to Professors Miriam Baer and 
Jennifer Laurin for these points. 
 233. Expert assistance may be necessary for these assessments, raising important issues under 
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77–83 (1985), which held that indigent defendants are entitled to 
expert psychiatric assistance when necessary for a fair trial. 
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offender’s mental illness and notify the court could serve as the basis for a Sixth 
Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim.234 
However, requiring judges to consider an offender’s vulnerability could yield 
negative consequences as well.  Guaranteeing consideration of vulnerability, 
particularly if it would necessitate a hearing, ultimately may not result in 
judicially tailored sentences.  Instead, a defendant’s right to a hearing, if 
waivable, may simply offer another “bargaining chip” for plea negotiations.235  
Further, mandatory consideration may result in a more complicated and 
expensive sentencing process that requires more preparation time, longer 
hearings, and possibly opinions from and examinations of mental health 
witnesses.  On the other hand, increasing the attention of institutional players to 
the existence and plight of mentally ill offenders could result in overall savings 
from the diversion of low-level offenders with mental illnesses, higher rates of 
plea bargaining, and the increased use of less costly, alternative sanctions.  
Moreover, savings may result from reductions in hospital days,236 and possibly 
reduced rates of recidivism, 237 resulting from better treatment in prison.  
Because this analysis is so complex, further evaluation is necessary before 
recommending that legislatures require or merely permit judges to consider 
disordered offenders’ vulnerability at sentencing. 
                                                 
 234. See Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203–04 (2001) (holding that the failure by 
defense counsel to object to an error of law that could affect sentencing is deficient performance 
for purposes of ineffective assistance of counsel, and that this deficient performance could suffice 
to show prejudice); Hessick, supra note 187, at 1080-86 (examining the standard for ineffective 
assistance of counsel in mandatory sentencing systems under Glover). 
 235. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 224–27 
(2011); Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 150, 172 (2012) (reflecting that often “new rights have had unintended consequences, 
encouraging legislatures to broaden criminal laws and give prosecutors more bargaining chips, 
diverting attention from innocence, favoring well-off defendants with well-funded counsel, and 
increasing the hydraulic pressures to plead guilty and waive rights”); cf. Talia Fisher, The 
Boundaries of Plea Bargaining: Negotiating the Standard of Proof, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
943, 944–45 (2007) (observing that many features of the criminal process have turned into 
“bargaining chips” and arguing that permitting defendants to waive their rights results in the 
efficient resolution of criminal cases and may advance the defendant’s autonomy). 
 236. See infra notes 276–80 and accompanying text (citing the cost savings resulting from 
treatment in intermediate care facilities). 
 237. See, e.g., JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT 136–38 (2001) 
(finding that patients who attended mental health or substance abuse treatment sessions were less 
likely to commit violent acts after hospital discharge than those who attended fewer sessions or did 
not receive any treatment); Johnston, supra note 159, at 558–61, 566 (reporting that mental illnesses 
may directly contribute to the criminality of approximately ten percent of the mentally disordered 
offender population and suggesting that treating this population’s mental illnesses and any  
co-occurring substance abuse may be effective in reducing recidivism); supra note 160 and 
accompanying text. 
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The remainder of this Article explores some of the conditions that judges 
could order under a procedure allowing a reopening of an offender’s sentence.238  
These proposals build upon the statutory frameworks presented in Part III and 
extend the principles illustrated there to terms of confinement.  The sections 
below list possibilities by degree of intrusiveness into correctional affairs and 
first profile reforms that would infringe upon correctional affairs the least.  
Efficiency benefits and disadvantages associated with each option are explored. 
B.  Authority to Order Mental Health Evaluations 
One way in which judges could improve the prison experiences of vulnerable, 
disordered defendants would be to ensure that they receive comprehensive 
mental health evaluations by qualified mental health professionals at intake.  At 
the very least, this requirement would accelerate the timing of the assessment 
and eliminate the uncertainty of the screening process.239 
Authorizing judges to order a comprehensive mental health examination 
would hold a number of benefits, but is not without risk.  Its primary benefit 
would be to increase the likelihood that vulnerable, disordered offenders would 
receive necessary treatment and appropriate housing assignments.  Because the 
sentencing judge’s assessment of a defendant’s mental health may be more 
accurate than an intake evaluator’s assessment,240 allowing a judge to trigger a 
comprehensive mental health evaluation could result in a more thorough, 
accurate, and efficient correctional evaluation process that identifies a greater 
proportion of disordered individuals.241  However, one potential disadvantage of 
this option is that judges could order evaluations that ultimately prove to be 
unnecessary, resulting in wasted resources.  In addition, permitting judges to 
order comprehensive evaluations for specific offenders may delay the 
assessments of other deserving individuals. 
Notably, a judge’s finding of mental disorder could serve as a more 
appropriate mechanism for securing the primary benefit of a guilty but mentally 
ill verdict.  While statutes differ, one common formulation allows a jury to find 
a defendant who has asserted an insanity defense “guilty but mentally ill,” thus 
exposing him to any sentence appropriate for his offense but specifying the 
                                                 
 238. See supra text accompanying note 221. 
 239. See supra Part I.A–B. 
 240. See supra note 208 (listing steps in the criminal justice process that allow for the 
consideration of a defendant’s mental disorder and observing that judges will likely have less 
information about defendants who plead guilty than those who proceed to trial); supra note 210 
(listing rights afforded to defendants at sentencing). 
 241. Intake evaluators typically consider information concerning a defendant’s mental health 
history and needs that is included in a presentencing report, and judges can play an important role 
in ensuring the completeness and accuracy of this information.  Evidence suggests, however, that 
intake evaluators may perform evaluations without the benefit of these reports.  See supra note 73. 
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defendant’s eligibility for mental health treatment while incarcerated.242  
Typically, offenders found guilty but mentally ill do not actually obtain better 
treatment than other mentally ill prisoners.243  In some states, however, the 
verdict has increased offenders’ likelihood of receiving psychiatric evaluations, 
thereby improving the odds that their illnesses will be detected and that they will 
ultimately receive mental health treatment in prison.244  A judge’s finding at 
sentencing could operate in a similar fashion. 
Moreover, a sentencing judge’s finding of mental disorder would be more 
probative, and more appropriate, than the finding of mental disorder 
communicated through a guilty but mentally ill verdict.  Commentators have 
criticized these verdicts on the basis that assessments of mental disorder at the 
time of the crime are largely irrelevant to a prisoner’s mental health needs during 
confinement.245  This objection has less purchase in the context of sentencing, 
however, because the sentencing judge’s concerns rightfully extend to an 
inmate’s anticipated mental health needs in prison and because this assessment 
occurs closer to the time of incarceration.246 
                                                 
 242. Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time Should 
Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494, 494–95 (1985). 
 243. See Lisa A. Callahan et al., Measuring the Effects of the Guilty But Mentally Ill (GBMI) 
Verdict, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 447, 460 (1992); Ingo Keilitz, Researching and Reforming the 
Insanity Defense, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 289, 319 (1987); John Q. La Fond & Mary L. Durham, 
Cognitive Dissonance: Have Insanity Defense and Civil Commitment Reforms Made a Difference?, 
39 VILL. L. REV. 71, 103 (1994); Slobogin, supra note 242, at 513–14 (identifying legal and fiscal 
constraints that minimize differences in the treatment afforded to guilty and guilty but mentally ill 
prisoners). 
 244. Slobogin, supra note 242, at 514 n.95 (observing that, “[i]n many states, guilty but 
mentally ill offenders receive post-conviction evaluation more often than do other offenders; 
therefore, their treatment needs are more likely to be identified”); see also Keilitz, supra note 244, 
at 319 (concluding, based on a review of records from Georgia, Illinois, and Michigan, that at least 
ninety percent of guilty but mentally ill inmates received a post-conviction mental health evaluation 
and that treatment was recommended in sixty-four to seventy-two percent of those cases). 
 245. Slobogin, supra note 242, at 518; cf. Mark A. Woodmansee, The Guilty But Mentally Ill 
Verdict: Political Expediency at the Expense of Moral Principle, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 341, 385 (1996) (“Although the jury [in a guilty but not mentally ill case] found 
evidence of mental illness, this indicates only that the defendant suffered from mental illness at the 
time of the offense.  Such a determination is not dispositive of whether the defendant should receive 
mental health treatment at the time he is sentenced.”). 
 246. A defendant’s mental disorder may impact sentencing in several ways.  For instance, his 
mental impairment at the time of the crime may serve as a mitigating factor to the extent that it 
reduces his culpability.  Conversely, mental illness may aggravate a defendant’s sentence, as 
sentencing bodies often assume that mental disorder correlates with dangerousness.  See Ellen F. 
Berkman, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 291, 298–300 (1989) (discussing the use of mental disorder, typically a mitigating factor, as 
an aggravating circumstance in capital sentencing). 
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C.  Authority to Disqualify Certain Facilities 
Another option to reduce a vulnerable, disordered prisoner’s risk of harm 
would be to authorize judges to disqualify certain facilities for placement.  A 
judge may find a facility unacceptable for a particular offender for a number of 
reasons, including the facility’s thin mental health staffing, inadequate mental 
health services,247 lack of specialized housing for individuals with serious but 
non-acute mental disorders,248 dearth of protective housing, high rates of 
violence, or overcrowding.  A facility may also be objectionable because of its 
regular practice of disciplining, protecting, or maintaining offenders in 
isolation.249  Many prisons place vulnerable inmates in protective custody in 
extremely restrictive conditions, which may cause acute psychological 
deterioration and distress.250  Offenders with serious mental disorders are both 
vulnerable to abuse and likely to experience difficulty complying with prison 
rules.251  Thus, disqualifying facilities that respond to these foreseeable 
                                                 
 247. See, e.g., BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 27, at 1–2, 5; Ronald W. Manderscheid et al., 
Growth of Mental Health Services in State Correctional Facilities 1988 to 2000, 55 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVICES 869, 871 tbl.1 (2004) (reporting the number and percentage of adult correctional facilities 
that provide twenty-four-hour mental health care, therapy, and medication in each state). 
 248. See infra Part IV.E (discussing the existence of and benefits offered by intermediate care 
facilities). 
 249. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.  Several courts have held that the 
prolonged isolation of offenders with serious mental illnesses constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment.  See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Jeff George, The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth 
Amendment Analysis of Imposing Prolonged Supermax Solitary Confinement on Inmates with a 
Mental Illness, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 25–31 (2012); Johnston, supra note 2, at 178 & n.156.  
Many professional organizations now recommend that penal institutions avoid the prolonged 
segregation of inmates with serious mental illnesses.  See AM. BAR. ASS’N, TREATMENT OF 
PRISONERS: AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 23-
2.8(a), at 55–56 (3d ed. 2010), (“No prisoner diagnosed with serious mental illness should be placed 
in long-term segregated housing.”); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, POSITION STATEMENT ON 
SEGREGATION OF PRISONERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 35 (2013), available at 
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/MH/Documents/2013_04_AC_06c_APA_ps2012_PrizSeg.pdf 
(“Prolonged segregation of adult inmates with serious mental illness, with rare exceptions, should 
be avoided due to the potential for harm to such inmates.”); Restricted Housing of Mentally Ill 
Inmates, SOC’Y OF CORRECTIONAL PHYSICIANS (July 9, 2013), 
http://societyofcorrectionalphysicians.org/resources/position-statements/restricted-housing-of 
-mentally-ill-inmates (acknowledging “that prolonged segregation of inmates with serious mental 
illness, with rare exceptions, violates basic tenets of mental health treatment” and that “[i]nmates 
who are seriously mentally ill should be either excluded from prolonged segregation status (i.e. 
beyond 4 weeks) or the conditions of their confinement should be modified in a manner that allows 
for adequate out-of-cell structured therapeutic activities and adequate time in an appropriately 
designed outdoor exercise area”); Solitary Confinement as a Public Health Issue, AM. PUB. 
HEALTH ASS’N (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.apha.org/advocacy/policy/policysearch 
/default.htm?id=1462 (calling on correctional authorities to “[e]xclude from solitary confinement 
prisoners with serious mental illnesses”). 
 250. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 202 nn.257–59. 
 251. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. 
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predicaments in ways that imperil disordered inmates could serve as an 
important means to excise those sources of harm most likely to render an 
offender’s sentence excessive or inhumane. 
However, this option has several practical limitations.  While disqualifying a 
facility for a given prisoner could, in theory, pose minimal difficulty for a 
correctional agency, that outcome would depend upon the number of available 
facilities and the security levels present within each one.252  Additionally, ruling 
out a particular facility does not guarantee that the offender will be confined in 
humane or appropriate conditions.  Consequently, whether this method will 
actually improve conditions of confinement remains to be seen.  Disqualifying 
certain facilities could even result in greater hardship for an offender if, for 
example, he were placed in a facility farther away from his family or support 
network. 
D.  Authority to Designate Certain Kinds of Facilities 
Alternatively, legislatures could grant trial courts the authority to order a 
vulnerable, disordered offender to serve—or at least start253—his sentence in a 
particular level or kind of facility, such as one with certain mental health, 
programming, or protective resources, assuming that a facility within that class 
is capable of managing an offender’s security risks.254  For example, the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons has designated facilities as CARE Level 1, 2, 3, or 4 
institutions.255  Facilities at each level are capable of responding to a different 
degree of medical need, either directly or through their proximity to community 
medical centers or major regional treatment centers.256  Only Level 4 
institutions, which include federal medical centers, supply limited inpatient care 
and may offer inpatient mental health units.257  Thus, if Congress were to 
sanction this option, a federal judge could require a vulnerable, disordered 
                                                 
 252. See infra note 254. 
 253. See infra text accompanying note 287.  Multiple considerations militate toward allowing 
prison officials to transfer prisoners among facilities, such as prisoners’ evolving mental health 
statuses, the need to protect prisoners from emergent dangers within a particular facility, changes 
in prisoners’ security classifications, and institutional priorities and resource needs. 
 254. See infra notes 271–73 and accompanying text (detailing the benefits of an intermediate 
care unit).  Before imposing a condition that affects a defendant’s facility or housing placement, a 
judge should be aware of an inmate’s likely security level and ensure that correctional officials 
anticipate being able to satisfy the condition without unduly compromising the institution’s 
legitimate security needs.  See Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 213, at 408–09.  Indeed, experts report 
that, when the Federal Bureau of Prisons fails to follow a judicial recommendation regarding inmate 
placement, “it is usually because the judge has recommended a facility incompatible with the 
defendant’s security level.”  ELLIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 26–27. 
 255. See ELLIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 102–03. 
 256. See id. 
 257. Id. at 102. 
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offender to complete at least part of his sentence in a federal medical center with 
inpatient mental health services. 
This proposal is similar to, but would provide broader authority than that 
granted under, 18 U.S.C. § 4244.  Section 4244, as discussed in Part III.A, 
authorizes a trial court to commit certain mentally disordered offenders for 
hospitalization as part of a provisional sentence.258  If a court finds that an 
individual has a mental disorder under the first prong of § 4244 but does not 
require commitment for treatment under the second prong, it may recommend 
his placement in a correctional facility capable of providing a certain level of 
mental health treatment.259  The instant proposal would make these 
recommendations presumptively binding.260  The approach would also eliminate 
a major disadvantage of 18 U.S.C. § 4244: the requirement that judges order 
provisional sentences for the maximum statutory term.261 
E.  Authority to Designate a Particular Facility 
Another, more intrusive option would involve authorizing courts to choose 
the particular facility in which an offender will begin his sentence, assuming that 
the facility is capable of managing his security risk level.262  For example, a 
legislature could establish that seriously disordered offenders who would face 
unacceptable levels of hardship in a typical prison environment should serve 
their sentences in facilities capable of offering an appropriate therapeutic 
environment.  The legislature could then grant sentencing judges the authority 
to identify qualifying individuals and to select available facilities that comply 
with this directive.  One attractive option for vulnerable, mentally disordered 
offenders would be a prison with an intermediate care facility or residential 
treatment units.  Treatment in these units has been shown to “dramatically 
improve the quality of life” of mentally ill inmates who have difficulty coping 
with the stresses of prison, especially those who are vulnerable to victimization 
or who struggle with medication compliance.263 
                                                 
 258. See supra notes 167–79 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements and 
application of § 4244). 
 259. See United States v. Chapman, 902 F.2d 1331, 1333–34 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Gigante, 989 F. Supp. 436, 438, 443 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 260. This placement would be subject to modification by reopening the sentence.  See text 
accompanying supra note 221. 
 261. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.  Many of the possible objections to allowing 
trial courts to designate a type of facility also apply to authorizing judges to assign an offender to a 
specific facility.  For this reason, the next section will consider objections to both proposals. 
 262. See supra note 254. 
 263. Fred Cohen & Joel Dvoskin, Inmates with Mental Disorders: A Guide to Law and 
Practice, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 462, 465 (1992). 
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Although many commentators have characterized prison as a toxic 
environment for individuals with serious mental illnesses,264 an exception seems 
to exist for many individuals housed in intermediate care facilities.  Intermediate 
care facilities, found in an increasing number of states,265 are designed to provide 
a stable and therapeutic environment for mentally ill prisoners266 who are unable 
to cope effectively in the general prison population but do not require hospital-
level care.267  Modeled on the “therapeutic community” and “therapeutic milieu” 
concepts advanced by Professor Hans Toch and his colleagues,268 intermediate 
care facilities provide inmates with a therapeutic environment that reduces the 
stressors and conditions that cause psychological degeneration and threaten 
victimization.269  These programs assume that, although most mental illnesses 
cannot be cured, with appropriate treatment mentally ill individuals can cope 
with their disorders.270  Many treatment modalities and programming options 
are typically available within these units or facilities.271  Through individual or 
group therapy, prisoners may learn symptom recognition, anger management, 
medical compliance strategies, communication techniques, and vocational 
                                                 
 264. See supra note 92. 
 265. See supra notes 115–26 (listing states with intermediate care facilities). 
 266. Many intermediate care programs focus on treating prisoners with severe mental illnesses.  
See, e.g., Ohio DRC, supra note 117; David Lovell et al., Evaluating the Effectiveness of 
Residential Treatment for Prisoners with Mental Illness, 28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 83, 86 (2001).  
Inmates with less serious disorders but significant coping problems are also eligible in some states.  
See, e.g., Ohio DRC, supra note 117; Ward S. Condelli et al., Intermediate Care Programs for 
Inmates with Psychiatric Disorders, 22 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 63, 67 tbl.2 (1994). 
 267. See CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note 93, at 35; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 40, 
at 130; Ohio DRC, supra note note 118; Va. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 107, at 2; WASH. DEP’T OF 
CORR., supra note 115, at 3. 
 268. See generally THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITIES IN CORRECTIONS (Hans Toch ed., 1984). 
 269. Lovell et al., supra note 266, at 86. 
 270. Id. 
 271. See CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note 91, at 35 (providing group therapy, individual 
counseling, and medication); Condelli et al., supra note 266, at 64 (noting that New York’s 
intermediate care facilities provide “milieu therapy, individual and group therapy, chemotherapy, 
recreation therapy, task and skills training, educational instruction, vocational instruction, and crisis 
intervention”); Lovell et al., supra note 266, at 86 (providing psychoeducational classes, 
counseling, and medication); see also Kupers et al., supra note 122, at 1042–43 (describing various 
programs provided by several different facilities). Intermediate care facilities may be located within 
separate correctional mental health facilities or in separate wards or units within individual prisons.  
For example, New York operates intermediate beds within eleven of its maximum security prisons.  
CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note 91, at 35.  Washington provides residential treatment in three 
facilities, including the McNeil State Prison.  WASH. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 116, at 4.  Kansas 
maintains a separate mental health facility.  See Larned Correctional Mental Health Facility, supra 
note 120.  Additionally, security levels vary among institutions, and even within individual 
programs.  See, e.g., Ohio DRC, supra note 117, at 4–5; VT. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 123, at 2; 
Kupers et al., supra note 122, at 1042 (describing Mississippi’s program). 
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skills.272  Rates of medication compliance are high in intermediate care facilities 
as a result of patient education, symptom management, frequent psychiatric 
consultations, and the increased privacy and decreased stigma surrounding 
psychotropic medication.273  Much like a halfway house or community care 
center outside of prison, these units are intended as short- or mid-term safe-
havens where inmates learn strategies for living in the general prison 
population.274  Although programs encourage reentry into the general 
population, some administrators allow inmates to remain in residential treatment 
units if reentry is not feasible given an inmate’s risk of victimization, self-harm, 
or medication noncompliance.275 
Several studies demonstrate that treatment in intermediate care facilities 
results in lower levels of mental disorder, disciplinary violations, and 
victimization, and may yield aggregate cost savings for prisons.276  A study by 
Professor David Lovell and his colleagues at the University of Washington 
reported: 
Inmates [who were treated in the intermediate care facility] were 
significantly more stable in terms of psychiatric symptoms when they 
left than when they arrived. Inmates had better infraction records and 
consumed less of the department’s management resources, . . . and 
were able to maintain themselves in [the] general population setting.277 
The study also found that inmates consumed fewer prison resources after 
completing treatment in the intermediate care program.278  Other studies have 
                                                 
 272. See CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note 91, at 35; Kupers et al., supra note 122, at  
1042–42; Lovell et al., supra note 266, at 86; MacKain & Messer, supra note 86, at 92, 96. 
 273. See CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note 91, at 36. 
 274. Id. at 36–37; VT. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 123, at 2; WASH. DEP’T OF CORR., supra 
note 116, at 3; Kupers et al., supra note 122, at 1042–43. 
 275. Intermediate care programs vary in duration.  In Washington, inmates spend a median of 
seven months in the McNeil mental health program.  Lovell et al., supra note 266, at 88.  Prison 
rules specify that prisoners may stay a maximum of eighteen months, but staff allow some inmates 
to stay longer if they believe no other situation is suitable.  Id. at 88–89  In New York, inmates may 
stay in intermediate care programs for years, and “many” never leave.  CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra 
note 91, at 38; see Condelli et al., supra note 266, at 65.  In North Carolina, most offenders complete 
the Social Skills Training Day Program in six to eight months, but offenders may remain in the 
program indefinitely if they are “not yet ready for transfer to a less restrictive environment.”  
MacKain & Messer, supra note 86, at 94. 
 276. See MacKain & Messer, supra note 86, at 91–92 (describing studies of the benefits of 
intermediate care facilities). 
 277. Lovell et al., supra note 266, at 100.  This study measured the number of disciplinary 
infractions that program participants received before and after completion and related that figure to 
a cost index.  Id. at 90–91. 
 278. Id. at 95 tbl.4.  The finding that intermediate care facilities may convey cost savings might 
be counterintuitive because these units typically require more mental health professionals, nurses, 
and counselors per inmate than units in the general population.  See, e.g., ALA. DEP’T OF CORR., 
supra note 124, at 4 (listing members of an inmate’s treatment team). 
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reached similar conclusions.279  Social scientists have speculated that 
intermediate care programs may help disordered inmates “generalize the skills 
they will need post-release and, therefore, offer promise in reducing stress and 
cost in a larger sphere of mental health treatment.”280 
These studies suggest that intermediate care facilities and residential treatment 
units offer a humane and affordable means of confining vulnerable offenders 
with serious mental illnesses.281  Legislatures should consider authorizing judges 
to sentence vulnerable, disordered offenders to confinement in a facility with 
residential treatment units, assuming that such a placement is consistent with an 
offender’s security and management needs.282  While laws in every jurisdiction 
currently provide for the treatment of prisoners with serious mental disorders,283 
correctional authorities may not transfer an offender to a specialized correctional 
facility or mental hospital until an offender is in acute distress.284  Admittedly, 
ordering the confinement of an offender in a particular facility with certain 
treatment or protective resources would not guarantee access to those services 
for the duration of his sentence.285  However, the proximity of these resources 
may increase the likelihood that an offender will benefit from them if the need 
arises, so long as they are available at the offender’s security level.286  In essence, 
it is easier to move an offender within a facility than between facilities, and 
authorities may be more likely to use intermediate care if it would not require 
transfer to another facility. 
                                                 
 279. See, e.g., CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note 91, at 37–39 (finding that intermediate care 
programs in New York successfully protected vulnerable prisoners from aggressive inmates and 
significantly reduced the rate of disciplinary infractions); Condelli et al., supra note 266, at 67–68 
(finding, in an earlier study of New York programs, significant reductions in mental health services 
received by program inmates, including crisis care, seclusion, and hospitalization, and reporting 
significant reductions in very serious infractions and suicide attempts but not in merely serious 
infractions, during the six months after admission to the program); Kupers et al., supra note 122, 
at 1046 (finding, in a study of Mississippi’s step-down program, that rates of disciplinary 
infractions dropped significantly when inmates entered the program, as compared to rates six 
months prior to entry, and remained low six months after the program ended). 
 280. MacKain & Messer, supra note 86, at 89. 
 281. See supra notes 276–79 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra note 254. 
 283. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 640 (5th ed. 
2009). 
 284. Such a result may follow from application of the least restrictive alternative doctrine.  See, 
e.g., Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (“Deprivations of liberty solely because 
of dangers to the ill persons themselves should not go beyond what is necessary for their 
protection.”). 
 285. Intermediate care “facilities” are often units within larger facilities.  See supra note 271. 
 286. See Holton, supra note 91, at 105 (observing that “some treatment modalities may not be 
available at all security levels, so an inmate may be unable to receive optimal care due to his or her 
security rating”). 
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A more intrusive option would involve allowing judges to designate initial 
presumptive placements in particular units.  Permitting a judge to order a 
vulnerable, disordered offender to start his carceral term in a residential 
treatment unit, for instance, would ensure that he receives a comprehensive 
evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment plan.  In addition, residing in an 
intermediate care facility for a few months would allow the inmate to acclimate 
to any new psychotropic medication, receive greater monitoring of his 
medication, benefit from individual and group therapy, and develop skills and 
strategies for living in the general prison population, such as symptom 
recognition, anger management, medical compliance, and interpersonal skills.287  
The inmate would thus be better equipped to cope successfully in the general 
prison population when (and if) he is transferred out of the unit.  The inmate may 
also be less likely to fall through the cracks of the prison’s mental health care 
docket if his mental health later deteriorates.  Because this placement would be 
presumptive, the offender could begin his term in another unit if a qualified 
mental health professional believes that another environment could satisfy his 
treatment and protection needs.288 
Despite the benefits of initial placement designation, there are valid objections 
to allowing judges to tailor sentences in this way.  Placing individuals first in 
line for residential treatment slots could result in inequity and a misallocation of 
resources because correctional officials may be unable to assign the neediest and 
most vulnerable offenders to these units.  Judicial placement authority may also 
result in designated offenders’ receiving more costly housing than is necessary 
given their post-sentencing mental health statuses.  However, allowing the 
government to move to reopen a sentence if an ordered placement becomes 
unnecessary, infeasible, or unreasonable may respond adequately to these 
concerns.289 
Other objections are more difficult to diffuse.  Allowing judges to make 
facility designations would impede the ability of correctional authorities to 
forecast prison housing and resource needs.  Given the number of offenders with 
serious mental illnesses entering the prison system,290 permitting judges to order 
a subset of these offenders to begin their sentences in residential treatment units 
may require an expansion of those units.291  Furthermore, this option would 
                                                 
 287. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.  Over a third of inmates in North Carolina’s 
Social Skills Day Training Program arrive directly after entering the prison system.  See MacKain 
& Messer, supra note 86, at 93, 96. 
 288. See text accompanying supra note 221 (describing the proposed process to reopen 
sentences). 
 289. See id. 
 290. See supra note 6. 
 291. Many mental health experts, organizations, and advocates have urged states to expand the 
number and capacities of intermediate care facilities.  See, e.g., CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note 
91, at 40; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 133–34; Holton, supra note 91, at 116. 
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provide only temporary relief to vulnerable, disordered offenders, since 
correctional officials would be free to transfer inmates out of the therapeutic 
environments after some period of time.292  As an alternative, legislatures could 
authorize judges to order that vulnerable, disordered offenders presumptively 
spend the entirety of their carceral terms in protective, therapeutic units, at least 
in states in which such a long-term option exists.293  This alternative could be 
structured similarly to the commitment measures detailed in Part III.A.  
However, judicial decisions pursuant to this authority would compound 
forecasting and resource allocation problems. 
F.  Authority to Mandate Certain Treatment Consequences 
A final option would permit courts to attach certain treatment conditions to 
the carceral sentences of vulnerable, disordered individuals.294  Under this 
proposal, correctional officials would retain authority over housing decisions, 
but judicial qualifications could govern the treatment of particular offenders.  A 
number of conditions are possible.  For example, assuming an offender’s mental 
health problems continue to merit treatment,295 a judge could order that the 
offender receive an individualized treatment plan within a designated period of 
time and treatment in accordance with that plan, plus additional treatment as 
necessary, over the course of his confinement.  The court could require periodic 
assessments of the nature and extent of the defendant’s mental illness and 
updates regarding his mental health, housing, and treatment.296 
Further, to mitigate the risk of serious harm to a disordered prisoner, a judge 
could attach additional conditions to his sentencing order.  The judge could 
direct correctional officials to consider the offender’s mental disorder, and its 
possible contribution to a disciplinary violation, in any disciplinary 
proceeding.297  A judge could order that, in responding to future rule violations, 
                                                 
 292. See supra note 275 (discussing the average length of stay in intermediate care facilities). 
 293. But see supra note 253 (listing considerations that support maintaining correctional 
officials’ abilities to transfer inmates among facilities). 
 294. See Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 213, at 408–09 (outlining practices that would aid judges 
in crafting realistic sentences that would achieve their intended purposes). 
 295. While a court could impose a presumptive need for treatment based on its assessment of 
an offender’s current and projected mental health needs, correctional mental health professionals 
must assess (and respond to) an offender’s treatment needs over time. 
 296. In this way, sentencing conditions could mimic the requirements of some guilty but 
mentally ill statutes.  See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2-6 (West 2013). 
 297. For example, a judge could mandate that a clinician review any disciplinary reports to 
discern whether mental disorder contributed to the infraction.  Cf. Ball, supra note 45, at 38–39 
(noting that, in California, a clinician must review the disciplinary report of every prisoner receiving 
mental health treatment to determine whether the prisoner’s mental disorder contributed to the 
infraction); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 35, at 26 (discussing the importance of clinical 
input in disciplinary issues).  Prisons vary in the extent to which they consider mental disorder in 
disciplinary proceedings.  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 62–64; Michael Krelstein, 
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officials use their best efforts to avoid imposing sanctions, such as prolonged 
isolation, likely to exacerbate an offender’s disorder.298  The sentencing order 
could provide that, if isolation is deemed necessary, any period spent in 
segregation must take place under conditions recommended by the American 
Psychiatric Association.299 These conditions include maximal access to 
structured, clinically indicated, out-of-cell programming and therapeutic 
activities (i.e., mental health/ psychiatric treatment) in appropriate, out-of-cell 
programming space, as well as regular, unstructured, out-of-cell recreation.300 
Allowing judges to affect correctional placement and treatment conditions, 
when those conditions are integral to their sentencing aims or the humaneness 
of a punishment, would merely increase the weight given to their current 
recommendations.  Federal law requires the Bureau of Prisons to consider 
judicial recommendations when assigning an offender to a particular facility.301  
Evidence demonstrates that federal judges offer recommendations regarding an 
offender’s placement, programming, or treatment in over forty percent of cases 
                                                 
The Role of Mental Health in the Inmate Disciplinary Process: A National Survey, 30 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY L. 488, 494 (2002). 
 298. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text (noting that mentally ill prisoners are 
disproportionately punished in solitary confinement, where they may be especially susceptible to a 
number of ill effects); supra note 249 (observing that some courts have held that the prolonged 
isolation of offenders with serious mental illnesses constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and 
that some professional organizations recommend that penal institutions avoid prolonged 
segregation of inmates with serious mental illnesses). 
 299. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 249, at 36. 
 300. Id. 
 301. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(4) (2006) (providing that the Bureau of Prisons, when 
designating the place of a prisoner’s imprisonment, must consider “any statement by the court that 
imposed the sentence (A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to imprisonment was 
determined to be warranted; or (B) recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as 
appropriate”); see also Fed. Bureau of Prisons, supra note 98, at 1, 4 (describing the Bureau’s 
placement system, providing guidelines for addressing judicial recommendations, and directing its 
designators to “make every effort to accommodate recommendations from the courts”). States also 
authorize and afford deference to judicial recommendations.  See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 4.480. 
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involving imprisonment.302  Estimates of accommodation differ,303 but recent 
evidence suggests that the Bureau fully or partially accommodates between 
sixty-six and seventy-three percent of judicial requests.304  This degree of 
deference is telling and reflects, as the Third Circuit has recognized, that 
“[j]udges take their sentencing responsibilities very seriously and are familiar 
with the various [Bureau of Prisons] institutions and programs.  Their 
recommendations as to the execution of sentences are carefully thought out and 
are important to them.”305  The degree of accommodation also demonstrates that 
the Bureau of Prisons usually finds judicial requests to be both reasonable and 
feasible to implement. 
V.  CONCLUSION AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION 
At sentencing, a judge can often foresee that an individual, because of his 
major mental disorder and other vulnerabilities, will experience serious 
psychological or physical harm in prison.  These harms may include 
psychological deterioration and mental distress, attempted suicide, and 
victimization by staff or other inmates.  In response, some jurisdictions allow a 
judge to commit a disordered offender for treatment in lieu of incarceration, and 
others designate the defendant’s need for treatment and likely undue hardship in 
prison as mitigating factors at sentencing.  However, these measures do not go 
far enough to protect vulnerable prisoners.  To prevent anticipated and unjust 
harms, legislatures should authorize judges to tailor the conditions of vulnerable, 
                                                 
 302. See Todd Bussert, “Real Time” Designation, Proximity to Home and the Importance of 
Judicial Recommendations, FED. PRISON & POST-CONVICTION BLOG (July 12, 2012), 
http://www.federalprisonblog.com/2012/07/real-time-designation-proximity-to-home-the 
-importance-of-judicial-recommendations.html (reporting that, between June 2011 and March 
2012, there were 40,563 judicial recommendations and 94,621 initial designations, meaning that 
judges offered recommendations for approximately forty-three percent of sentences during that 
period); Sonya Cole & Todd A. Bussert, BOP Presentation at United States Sentencing 
Commission’s Annual Federal Sentencing Guidelines Seminar (June 12, 2009), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Education_and_Training/Annual_National_Training_Seminar/2009/014a_B
OP_Issues.pdf (noting that requests for specific programming (such as vocational training, drug 
abuse treatment, or work assignments), confinement in a specific facility or medical center, and 
sentence calculation are common recommendations). 
 303. See, e.g., ELLIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 27 (citing unspecified Bureau statistics showing 
that the Bureau honored about eighty-five percent of judicial recommendations for facility 
placements in cases in which the defendant qualified for the recommended institution). 
 304. See Bussert, supra note 302 (reporting that the Bureau followed or partially followed 
sixty-six percent of judicial recommendations made between June 2011 and March 2012); Cole & 
Bussert, supra note 302 (reporting that the Bureau completely followed sixty-two percent, and 
partially followed eleven percent, of judicial recommendations).  Correctional facilities may not 
accommodate a judicial request because of conflicts between the recommended facility and the 
inmate’s security level, the inmate’s ineligibility for the recommended program, security concerns, 
or the unavailability of the requested program at the recommended facility.  Cole & Bussert, supra 
note 302, at 3. 
 305. Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 247 (3d Cir. 2005). 
2014] Conditions of Confinement at Sentencing 677 
disordered offenders’ sentences when specific conditions of confinement are 
integral to the judge’s sentencing aims or the humaneness of the punishment.  
Under one possible model, if correctional officials find a condition to be 
inappropriate, unnecessary, or infeasible, the government could move to reopen 
the sentence. 
A number of important practical issues remain for exploration.306  First, these 
proposals hold important budgetary implications.  Assessment of the costs or 
savings associated with allowing judges to tailor offenders’ sentences is 
necessary.  For instance, judges’ findings of mental disorder and vulnerability 
may save money for correctional departments by streamlining their assessment 
processes and reducing the need for initial mental health screenings.  Moreover, 
ensuring that vulnerable, disordered offenders receive adequate treatment and 
reside in protective environments may reduce these offenders’ hospitalization 
rates, disciplinary infractions, and rates of recidivism upon release.307  Judicially 
imposed conditions could also result in fewer suits alleging deprivations of civil 
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Each of these possibilities requires further study. 
Second, it is important to assess when formal judicial hearings would be 
necessary and what conditions would trigger such hearings.  A hearing may be 
necessary to discern the degree of a defendant’s mental illness and his level of 
vulnerability.  In addition, legislatures could require a hearing for any defendant 
with a history of institutionalization or in any case in which a claim of mental 
illness (such as that relating to incompetency, insanity, or diminished capacity) 
was raised during a defendant’s trial or in pretrial proceedings.  Furthermore, a 
hearing may aid sentencing judges in deciding whether to order conditions 
affecting a prisoner’s housing, discipline, or treatment. 
Third, legislatures should establish protections to ensure that conditions of 
confinement for vulnerable offenders are actually humane and appropriate.308  
One possibility is to require defense counsel to monitor the mental health and 
conditions of confinement of their vulnerable, disordered clients at regular 
intervals.  Attorneys possibly could request funds for monitoring under the 
Criminal Justice Act.309 
Finally, it is vital to consider how defense counsel’s limited resources and 
competing strategic considerations may affect the utilization of the measures 
proposed in this Article.  Defense counsel are often woefully underfunded and 
lack access to the investigative and expert resources necessary to prepare 
                                                 
 306. This section, in particular, benefited from conversations with participants at the 
University of Florida Levin College of Law’s Criminal Justice Center’s Junior Scholars’ 
Conference. 
 307. See supra notes 276–80. 
 308. I am grateful to Professor Douglas Berman for this observation. 
 309. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (2012) (authorizing reimbursement of reasonable out-of-pocket 
expenses necessary to provide an adequate defense for indigent defendants). 
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adequate defenses and effective mitigation cases at sentencing.310  Their access 
to expert assistance will likely be vital to effect the reforms this Article 
proposes.311  Furthermore, while mental disorder is associated with heightened 
vulnerability, its potential correlation with increased dangerousness may jsutify 
its use as an aggravating factor,312 such that its emphasis creates the risk of a 
longer sentence.313  How defense counsel should balance these competing 
strategic and moral concerns is an important topic for another day. 
 
                                                 
 310. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n, Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, Gideon’s 
Broken Promise: America’s Continuing Quest for Equal Justice 36–41 (2004), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sc
laid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 311. See supra note 233 (recognizing important issues under Ake v. Oklahoma). 
 312. For a discussion of the relationship between mental disorder and crime, including crimes 
of violence, see Johnston, supra note 159, at 564–75. 
 313. See, e.g., Berkman, supra note 246, at 299–300 (discussing the use of mental disorder, a 
mitigating factor, as an aggravating circumstance in capital sentencing). 
